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Abstract: 
Over the past decade, Cultural Neuroscience has helped to characterize how 
culture shapes the brain by disclosing intercultural differences in behaviour and brain 
responses. In this study, we investigated how culture can shape brain function during a 
luck-based game, the Rock-Paper-Scissors game (RPS), and an economic-based 
game, the Ultimatum game (UG), given that the perception of the outcome and free-
riders (i.e., individuals that take advantage of a situation, for their own profit, but with 
losses for others), may vary across cultures, at a neurobiological level. 
Therefore, a sample of 30 Latin (Mage = 25.53; SD =7.61) and 30 Anglo-Saxon 
participants (Mage =24.80; SD = 7.35) played the original format of RPS game and of the 
UG, while their electrical brain activity was recorded using a 32-channel 
electroencephalogram (EEG). We examined three feedback-locked event-related 
potentials (ERPs) that play a crucial role in post-outcome processing: the Feedback 
Related Negativity (FRN) and the P3 in the RPS and the Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN) 
in the UG. We also analysed a fourth ERP for neural processing of faces in the UG: the 
N170. In addition, participants played three other games (the Centipede Game, Public 
Goods Game and Volunteer’s Dilemma), in order to understand how their economic 
behaviours (in a volunteer and cooperation/free-riding level) are affected by their culture. 
No significant behavioural performance differences were observed between the 
two cultures in all the five tasks (p>0.05). However, our results showed that groups 
significantly differed in amplitude of both FRN and P3, revealing that culture may 
significantly influence the processing of feedback. Interestingly, we did not find a main 
effect of condition, since gains, losses and draws elicited similar amplitudes for both FRN 
and P3. Considering the functional significance of both components, this result may be 
explained by the fact that participants played a luck-based game, in which the 
expectations and the arousing level of each result were similar. Our results also showed 
that the perception of free-riders with the N170 and of the level of fairness with the MFN 
were not significantly different. However, Irish participants tended to be more sensitive 
to unfair opponents and unfair offers than Portuguese participants, revealing that 
Portuguese participants tend to make lower offers and keep more money for themselves, 
when compared to Irish participants. 
This study showed that under the same cognitive task, the two cultures performed 
differently at a neurobiological level, suggesting that the cultural settings might play a 
crucial role in brain functions. 
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Resumo: 
Durante a última década, a Neurociência Cultural ajudou a desvendar como a 
cultura influencia e molda o cérebro, revelando que existem diferenças interculturais não 
só a nível comportamental, como também a nível da atividade cerebral. Neste estudo, 
investigamos como a cultura pode influenciar a função cerebral durante um jogo 
baseado em sorte, o jogo do Pedra-Papel-Tesoura, e um jogo baseado em decisões 
económicas, o jogo do Ultimato, dado que a perceção do resultado final e da presença 
de oportunistas, respetivamente, pode variar entre culturas diferentes, nomeadamente 
a nível neurobiológico. 
Para esse efeito, uma amostra de 30 participantes latinos (Midade= 25,53; DP = 
7,61) e 30 anglo-saxões (Midade= 24,80; DP = 7,35) jogaram o formato original dos jogos 
Pedra-Papel-Tesoura e Ultimato, enquanto a atividade elétrica do cérebro foi registrada 
usando um eletroencefalograma (EEG) de 32 canais. Examinamos três potenciais 
relacionados com eventos associados ao processamento do feedback: A Negatividade 
Relacionada ao Feedback (NRF) e o P3 no RPS e a Negatividade Médio-Frontal (NMF) 
no UG. Também analisamos um quarto componente associado ao processamento de 
faces no UG: o N170. Para além disso, os participantes jogaram três outros jogos (o 
Jogo da Centopeia, o Jogo dos Bens Públicos e o Dilema do Voluntário), de forma a 
percebermos como é que os seus comportamentos económicos (altruísmo e 
cooperação / oportunismo, num contexto social) são afetados pela sua cultura. 
Não foram observadas diferenças significativas no desempenho comportamental 
entre as duas culturas, para cada um dos cinco jogos (p> 0,05). No entanto, os nossos 
resultados mostraram que os grupos diferiram significativamente em amplitude para o 
FRN e P3, revelando que a cultura pode influenciar significativamente o processamento 
de feedback. Curiosamente, não encontramos um efeito significativo entre as diferentes 
condições, uma vez que ganhos, perdas e empates originaram amplitudes semelhantes 
para FRN e P3. Considerando o significado funcional de ambos os componentes, esse 
resultado pode ser explicado pelo fato dos participantes terem jogado um jogo baseado 
na sorte, no qual as expectativas e o nível de excitação de cada resultado foram 
semelhantes.  
Os nossos resultados também revelaram que a perceção de oportunistas, com 
o N170, e do nível de justiça, com o MFN, não foram significativamente diferentes. 
Contudo, os irlandeses mostraram maior sensibilidade aos oponentes oportunistas a às 
ofertas injustas do que os portugueses, revelando que os portugueses tendem a fazer 
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ofertas mais baixas e a manter mais dinheiro para si próprios, quando comparados com 
os irlandeses. 
Este estudo demonstrou que sob a mesma tarefa cognitiva, as duas culturas 
tiveram um desempenho diferente a um nível neurobiológico, revelando que as 
características típicas de cada meio cultural desempenham um papel crucial nas 
funções cerebrais. 
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Outline 
This dissertation is divided into four different chapters: 
○ Chapter I includes relevant information regarding the understanding of Cultural 
Neuroscience (CN) and of Game Theory (GT), in order to introduce the importance of 
cooperation and free-riding within a culture. The purpose of this chapter is to approach 
these two concepts as a way to achieve the proposed goals. 
○ Chapter II explains how these concepts are approached and which methodologies and 
equipment were used to solve the main question of this research study, i.e., to know if 
there were differences between the Irish and Portuguese culture or not. 
○ Chapter III presents the results obtained from the work developed in Portugal and 
Ireland. 
○ Finally, Chapter IV reports the results discussion, main conclusions, as well as future 
studies that may not only contribute to the Cultural Neuroscience field, but also to the 
Economical field. 
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Chapter I 
 
1.1. Thesis Overview 
In a previous behavioural-based study (Lopes, 2014), which compared the 
Finnish and the Portuguese cultures, the authors used selected games from Game 
Theory (GT) to compare the two cultures and they observed that the Portuguese sample 
tended to withhold the punishment of free-riders, commonly called opportunists, although 
both the Portuguese and Finnish recognised the misconduct. Hence, Game Theory may 
provide a suitable framework to study cultures, bringing out the characteristic culturally 
rooted behaviours. Despite the results, the study did not include any neuroscientific 
technique. However, GT’s games have been used while recording the brain signals, 
revealing the neural bases of the economic-based decisions (Chung, Yun, & Jeong, 
2015; de Quervain et al., 2004; Lee, 2008; Polezzi et al., 2008; Pulford, Krockow, 
Colman, & Lawrence, 2016; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). 
Besides, several studies, that have been conducted in the last decade, demonstrated 
that neuroscience can measure cultural differences (Chiao et al., 2009; Han et al., 2013; 
Losin, Dapretto, & Iacoboni, 2010; Park, 2013; Roepstorff, 2013; Tieu & Konnert, 2015), 
naming this new neuroscientific field Cultural Neuroscience. 
In spite of Ireland and Portugal being similar in genetic aspects and being both 
European countries within the European Union, they differ in certain cultural features, 
such as education, social norms and economy. For instance, both countries faced an 
economic crisis in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and although they both exited the bailout 
programme, their economic performance trajectory is different, suggesting they 
addressed the crisis problem differently. 
 Therefore, studying people from these two countries using games from GT 
combined with a neuroimaging technique, such as the electroencephalography (EEG), 
will be interesting to disclosure the differences between these two cultures and to 
characterize their behaviour according to their brain responses. 
This research study was conducted with the aim of studying cooperation and free-
riding among native Portuguese and Irish individuals, while seeking for differences within 
the brain.  
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In order to do so, the experiment was divided in two different stages. The first one 
was conducted in the Psychology Lab of the Psychology Programme of the School of 
Nursing and Human Sciences at Dublin City University, in Ireland, and the second one, 
was conducted in the laboratory of Neuropsychophysiology of the University of Porto, in 
Portugal. A total of 66 individuals from each country were selected for the purpose of this 
study (cf. Appendix XVI for more information on the participants selected/dismissed from 
the study). 
1.2. Research question and aims 
Research question 
The research question presided over identifying and understanding how 
Portuguese and Irish individuals might differ on a cooperation and/or free-riding level, 
i.e., how constructs such as trust, altruism, altruistic punishment, and social sanctions, 
when culturally rooted, help the group dealing with and surpassing hard times and how 
brain signals reflect upon these processes. 
Main and specific aims 
The main goal of this research study was to understand how culture shapes brain 
functions, especially when applied to luck and economic-based behavioural contexts. 
On a deeper level, this research study’s specific aim was to understand how the 
perception of a certain stimulus affects brain function, as well as how it was processed 
during luck and economic-based decisions, in order to see if the differences observed 
on a neurobiological level are linked to cultural differences (and vice versa).  
Thus, the objectives for this research study were: 
1. To understand how the Event-Related Potential components are 
processed by our two samples. 
2. To neurally characterise specific facets of cultural behaviour using games 
from Game Theory. 
Expectations 
Considering that the techniques and procedures used to study how mental 
functions are shaped within a culture are not only available, but have been extensively 
used over the years, it is expected that the outcomes of this research study will increase 
our understanding of economic behaviour (e.g., on how to construct the paradigms to 
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study free-riding and cooperation, within a culture). It will also allow us to interpret and 
create new strategies used by each country, in order to overcome economic crisis.  
Regarding the results of this study, we anticipate significant behavioural 
differences across the two cultures considering that both Portugal and Ireland exited their 
bailouts differently. At a neurobiological level, we also expect to find differences that are 
influenced by the cultural settings of each of these countries. 
1.3. Introductory Background: Aims and Complexities of 
Cultural Neuroscience 
Cultural Neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field that aims to investigate human 
brain function and how its functioning is shaped by ethnographic phenomena. 
Furthermore, it also aims to explore how neural mechanisms may (or may not) contribute 
to the rise of divergent cultures around the world (Han et al., 2013). 
According to cultural psychology (Mateo et al., 2012; Chiao et al., 2009), the 
differences observed among cultures are due to the way each individual has acquired 
the beliefs and values from their indigenous culture. On the other hand, social 
neuroscience is used to investigate humans’ social behaviours and the brain 
mechanisms that trigger such actions.  
Cultural Neuroscience fuses both these scientific areas, studying how the cultural 
environment influences each individual brain, and how brains socialise with other brains, 
developing collectively concerted norms of conduct, which drive each one’s behaviour.  
Several studies have now been conducted in the past few years to unravel how 
culture modulates neural mechanisms underlying human cognitive and affective 
processes (Chiao et al., 2009; Han et al., 2013; Losin, Dapretto, & Iacoboni, 2010; Park, 
2013; Roepstorff, 2013). Most of these studies, however, have been emphasising the 
genetic approach, i.e., how genetic variance, in close linkage with the natural 
environment, has been favouring certain specific collective behaviours, coupled with the 
detriment of other behaviours, within an adaptive frame (Chiao, Cheon, 
Pornpattananangkul, Mrazek, & Blizinsky, 2013). Genetic-based Darwinian evolutionary 
processes may have been happening also within socio-cultural settings, besides the 
ecological ones, both playing active roles in gene selection. 
It is well known that a large portion of the human brain takes approximately 20 years 
to mature (Gogtay et al., 2004). During that time, it is influenced by environmental 
experiences, both ecological and socio-cultural, and therefore, undergoes several 
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structural and functional changes as a response, a process known as neuroplasticity: 
“Culture is an all-encompassing variable with which the brain is heavily saturated from 
birth.” (Park, 2013, p. 58). 
It is also important to acknowledge that Cultural Neuroscience is a new scientific 
subfield in neuroscience and thus, it still needs to answer many questions. For instance, 
it is unclear why some neurobiological mechanisms seem to be more sensitive to the 
environment and experiences than others. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore 
cultural values with group differences in the human brain and observe the connection 
between them. 
Park (2013), a Cultural Neuroscience pioneer, raised four issues regarding studies 
that focus on studying cultures at a neuroscientific level. 
The first issue is that that while genetics (“nature”) has an indubitable role in shaping 
brain’s structure and function, “(…) some cultural differences in neural function are 
exclusively a result of ‘nurture’, that is, cultural experiences, and that the brains of 
culturally diverse individuals are largely the same” (Park, 2013, p. 58). 
As we know, the environment, such as culture values, plays a key role in the way 
each person becomes as a human being, but more than that, it also affects our genes 
and brain’s responses. The capacity for humans to adjust and change due to social 
experiences, shows how important this neuroscientific field is and how it is crucial to 
study in more detail the plasticity of the human brain, especially across cultures. 
Therefore, even though the human brain may be genetically built, according to 
several findings, a large amount of neural differences arises after being contacted to 
social experiences, i.e., cultures shape brains. 
Nevertheless, cultures have so many dimensions (diet, education, health caring, 
etc.) that it is difficult to relate the observed brain variations to a specific cause. Hence, 
one may expect that cultural studies are rather difficult to control. Despite this, Losin et 
al. (2010) propose eight guidelines, which are addressed in the next Chapter II. 
The second issue is related to the hardwiring / soft wiring in the brain: do 
differences between cultures depend on genetically hardwired circuits, or are dissimilar 
results of the same processes but with other variables sets? Hardwired circuits mean 
that a certain range of outputs is empowered with limited influence of the inputs. Such 
architecture is difficult to change and little prone to outside modulations, e.g. the 
modulation of the prefrontal cortex or the anterior cingulate cortex (Cisek & Kalaska, 
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2010; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Marques dos Santos & Moutinho, 2015; Paus, 2001). 
The other way, the “soft” one, is that processes are much the same across humans and 
they would yield different behavioural results depending on the incoming cultural 
variables (and others). In this case, the influence of cultures would be mainly modulatory, 
but always prone to circumstantial adaptations, i.e., very difficult to control. However, 
cultural neuroscientific studies have not sufficiently addressed this issue yet, which 
means that the real imprints engraved by cultures in the brains are unknown and all 
hypotheses are open. 
This third issue relates to how deep the imprints left by cultures in the brains are, 
even structural imprints. Considering that there are several studies (Chiao & Ambady 
2007; Maguire et al. 2000), that demonstrate how the brain, after some practice, can 
change its own shape (e.g., training in juggling or being a taxi driver for long increase 
the volume of specific areas of the brain), it would be interesting to do the same for cross-
cultural studies, i.e., seek for volumetric changes promoted by cultural aspects. 
Finally, the last issue raised by Park (2013) is the need to replicate studies across 
several examples of cultures and refrain overgeneralisations. Because samples are 
usually small, so they are the effects, and jumping to general conclusions should be 
cautious, even more due to the dimensional complexity that cultures encompass. This 
observation is relevant, since it will give more consistency, credibility and benchmarks 
that can be used for future studies in this field (cf. Guidelines for cultural neuroscience 
studies, in Chapter II). 
1.4. What is culture? 
Cultural Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary field that aims to find relations 
between brain functioning and cultural behaviour (Han et al., 2013). But, what is in fact 
culture? How can it be defined? 
There is a set of definitions that varies across different research fields. For 
instance, anthropologists refer to it as a full range of meanings (e.g., set of traditions, 
beliefs and values) that are passed down from one generation to the next one (Han et 
al., 2013). Moreover, the social psychologists would define it as a set of social rules and 
social institutions, more specifically ideas, values, beliefs and behaviour (Han et al., 
2013). 
The meaning of culture often leads to confusion and then different definitions, 
since it is often mistaken and overlapped by other concepts, such as nationality, race 
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and/or language. For instance, we can share a place of origin, a country, being of the 
same nationality, however, that does not mean we share the same beliefs, values or 
practices (culture). Normally, it would be intuitive to think that both language and race 
would be correlated to nationality, however, this is not applicable if someone immigrated 
to another country. 
Therefore, as a way to avoid using different terms or definitions for culture, most 
Cultural Neuroscience studies (Chiao et al., 2009; Han et al., 2013; Losin et al., 2010) 
agreed to use the term culture associated with sharing the same beliefs, specific 
cognitive processes, values, knowledges and/or practices. 
1.5. Introducing Game Theory 
Game Theory (GT) offers a methodology that  allows to study conflict (e.g. free-
riding) and cooperation in decision-making processes (Alencar & Yamamoto, 2008), 
being widely used in several fields such as Economy, Political Sciences, Psychology and 
Biology (Myerson, 1991). 
Within the Biological field, for example, several studies were conducted to 
analyse human behaviour in decision-making processes (Chung, Yun, & Jeong, 2015; 
de Quervain et al., 2004; Lee, 2008; Polezzi et al., 2008; Pulford, Krockow, Colman, & 
Lawrence, 2016; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). On the other hand, 
GT also found application for the interpretation of a wide class of social interactions 
(Henrich et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2006; Lee, 2008; Lopes, 2014) and since this study 
will compare two different countries together, it will be interesting to see how cooperation, 
trust, fairness and coordination work between people from within each culture. Hence, 
cooperation and free-riding will be promoted, to measure behavioural and neural 
differences between both cultures.  
In Economics, the so called “free-rider problem” occurs when a common or 
shared public good is taken inadvertently by some members of a group, as a way to gain 
some personal advantages (Baumol, 1952). Besides, if the individuals belonging to the 
group or culture see that there are other members that may free-ride, then they will tend 
to reduce their contributions towards the group due to those who are being opportunistic 
(Ruël et al., 2003).  
In Lopes (2014), the researchers decided to study Finnish and Portuguese people 
using games from Game Theory and they found out that even though both Finnish and 
Portuguese people saw free-riding as a misconduct, whenever they had the chance to 
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pay to punish, Portuguese avoided to enter with costs that would punish free-riders, 
unlike the Finnish, proving that social norms and social sanction might be perceived 
differently across cultures, hence proving that Game Theory is a useful tool to study 
(dis)similarities between cultures. 
Other studies found that it is possible to measure cultural differences using 
neuroscientific techniques (Chiao et al., 2009; Han et al., 2013; Losin, Dapretto, & 
Iacoboni, 2010; Park, 2013; Roepstorff, 2013; Tieu & Konnert, 2015). As far as we know, 
the idea of conjoining Cultural Neuroscience with Game Theory, in order to investigate 
the electrophysiological correlates of luck-based and economic responses between two 
European cultures and explore how the environment can influence these decision-
making processes, is an idea yet to be explored. Therefore, considering the scope of our 
research (i.e., to study cooperation / free-riding and luck-based decisions), we anticipate 
similar behavioural responses as the ones obtained in Lopes, et al. 2014, at least 
regarding the Portuguese sample.  
Considering the neurophysiological approach, knowing that previous studies 
proved that culture has a strong influence on brain functions, we predict that there will 
be differences, as the perception of an outcome and even the recognition of a free-rider 
varies across cultures (e.g. a more competitive culture vs. a less competitive culture or 
a culture that is more sensitive to the level of fairness of an offer vs. a culture that is less 
sensitive to the level of fairness of an offer, respectively).  
1.6. Criteria to select the games and justification of their choice 
This research intends to use Game Theory (GT) as a tool to study cultures. 
However, there is a large set of different games in GT and therefore, not every game is 
suitable to study cultural differences and more specifically cooperation vs. free-riding. 
For this purpose, a set of 33 different games have been analysed in Wikipedia (cf. Annex 
I) considering different criteria (e.g. how many strategies per player there are; Nash 
equilibrium -when the strategies chosen by both players are the best decision for them-; 
if it is a sequential/simultaneous and zero/non-zero-sum game with perfect/imperfect 
information; and finally, what they measure) that would then suit the main purpose of this 
study. 
Lopes (2014) also used several games from GT, in order to study social norms, 
trust and economic behaviour, cooperative and competitive behaviour and costly 
punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Gächter 
et al., 2004 Tu & Bulte, 2010; Cameron et al., 2013; Henrich et al., 2006a) between 
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Portuguese and Finnish people. Regarding their findings, Lopes and colleagues 
observed that Finnish tended to trust and take more risk-based decisions investing more 
money than the Portuguese sample. Portuguese were also more prone to compete than 
Finnish and finally, even though both cultures acknowledged when there was a 
misconduct, the Portuguese sample tended to refrain the punishment of free-riders, 
commonly called opportunists.  
These results also revealed very helpful when selecting the games that are more 
suitable to compare and study Portuguese and Irish people, on a cooperative / free-ride 
level and in order to measure (behaviourally and neurally) the putative differences 
between these two cultures.  
Thus, the following selected games from GT will be used: 
○ Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) 
Rock – Paper – Scissors is based on pure luck mostly, rather than on a wise 
strategy or economic wisdom. The purpose of this game is to control possible differences 
between the devices and acquisition environments in Ireland and Portugal in order to 
assess that both data sets are comparable, i.e., the behavioural responses are expected 
to be similar or equivalent between the two countries, given that luck is not influenced by 
culture, while the perception of the outcome (win, draw or lose) may vary across 
environments. We therefore anticipate no behavioural and neurobiological differences 
across cultures (as there is no “wisdom” attached when making the choice between the 
three options available, i.e., Rock, Paper or Scissors); even though, we suspect that at 
a neurobiological level, the perception of winning and/or losing may be stronger and/or 
more significant in one of the cultures (e.g., a more competitive one).  
In each run, two players at the same time choose one among rock, paper, or 
scissors. Besides draws, rock wins scissors, scissors win paper, and paper wins rock. 
However, participants will be previously informed that this will be the only game, in which 
they will be playing with a computer and not a person. The rationale is to collect data 
free from social interactions as much as possible, , in order to control possible differences 
between the devices and acquisition environments in Ireland and Portugal. Because it is 
mostly luck and we assume that luck is not influenced by the nurturing culture, the 
behavioural responses and possibly the brain activity is expected to be equivalent 
between the two sites. Otherwise, the devices and/or the acquisition environment may 
be influencing the collection of the data. 
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○ Ultimatum game (UG) 
The Ultimatum game is used to study fairness. There is plenty of neurobiological 
evidence which show that, in unfair situations, specific Regions Of Interest (ROIs) of the 
brain are activated (Sanfey et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005; Knoch et al., 2006). 
Those regions are the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the insula and the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). These brain regions participate in solving conflicts between 
the wish to win something and the aversion of being treated unfairly. 
Two players participate in the UG. These two players interact to decide how to 
divide a sum of money that is given to them. While the first player makes an offer on how 
to split the amount of money, the second player will either accept or reject the offer. If 
the second player rejects the proposal made by the first player, then none of them will 
receive anything (Barr et al., 2009). The game is normally played once so that 
reciprocation does not become an issue. However, because the EEG signal is weak and 
would not differentiate from noise in one shot trials, the participating participant will be in 
the place of the receiver and playing with multiple and different proposers, one at a time. 
Rationally thinking, one would expect that all proposals would be accepted, even 
the unfair ones. However, there is a paradox: 
- The receiver (i.e., the participant in this study) has the opportunity to reject 
the unfair offers. In this case neither the participant, nor the proposer receive 
money, i.e., while even 1 cent would be better than nothing and rationally the 
receiver would accept every offer distinct from 0, previous experiences 
(Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) have been showing that 
receivers use to reject offers lower than 20%, punishing unfair offers with a 
cost for him/her. The offers are manipulated but balanced across all 
participants.  
The choice of this game instead of the Dictator Game, as in Lopes (2014), was 
due to the fact that the UG allows to prompt free-riding behaviours, so that each 
participant is able to choose between fair and unfair actions and decide whether they 
want to punish their opponent by rejecting an offer. 
○ Centipede Game (CG) 
The Centipede Game is an example of a coordination game, being for that reason 
suitable to study cooperation and competition in dynamic interactions. Like the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, this game battles between common and self-interest. However, unlike this, the 
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CG allows the player to move sequentially, knowing the decision of the other player. This 
provides a good model of “everyday relationships” that Prisoner’s dilemma does not offer 
(Pulford et al., 2016). According to Pulford et al., 2016, “The Centipede game is an ideal 
tool for studying the motivational bases of reciprocal cooperation, because it is a dynamic 
game that presents players with greater scope for expressing cooperative/competitive, 
selfish/altruistic, trusting/distrustful, and individualistic/collective motives than other 
dyadic games” (pp. 1 - 2). Therefore, it will be interesting to include this game in this 
research study. 
In the Centipede Game, two players pass each other a pot. The pot has an initial 
amount of money and every time the pot passes from one player to the other the amount 
of money increases by an established quantity. Each player in each turn makes the 
decision: or takes all the amount in the pot for him/herself, or just passes the pot to the 
other player giving to the other the possibility of keeping with everything (McKelvey & 
Palfrey, 1992; Rosenthal, 1981). This game is here played in three runs: in one, 
cooperation will be promoted, in another one, the opposite player firstly will cooperate 
and then will start keeping with all the amount for him/her precociously, and finally, the 
opponent will take the selfish decision just from the beginning. The participant will be 
playing with a fake opponent all the time, and during the debriefing this misapprehension 
will be dismounted, so the participant does not leave the study having been deceived. 
○ Public Goods Game (PGG) 
Previous studies have found that, after repeated interactions, the levels of 
cooperation tend to decrease and the called “free-riders” or “defectors” start to appear 
after a few sessions, i.e., the Public Goods Game proves to be useful if the goal is to 
investigate cooperation and free-riding in humans and to observe the evolution of the 
participants’ behaviour (Alencar & Yamamoto, 2008; Chung et al., 2008). The social 
interpretation of the results emphasises the group cohesion and cultural norms to explain 
the prosocial (i.e., a behaviour that promotes social acceptance and friendship) 
outcomes of the public goods. 
The Public Goods Game is a game that involves at least three players that have 
to secretly choose how many of their own tokens (money usually) they want to put into 
a public pot that is shared amongst them. After the players bets, the tokens inside of the 
pot are multiplied by a factor (greater than 1) and this "public good" payoff is evenly 
divided among players. Each participant will also keep the tokens they did not contribute 
to (Croson, 2007; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). It can 
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be played in one iteration, but it is more interesting if there is repeated play (the players 
have the opportunity to adjust their offers to the other players and search for free-riders 
that do not invest but get the payoffs). Here, it is played in three runs, each run between 
the participant and four other players. In the first run the fake players will promote 
cooperation (participate intensively with tokens) maximizing the earnings of the group, in 
the second run one of the fake players will suddenly adopt a free-riding posture by the 
middle of the run, and in the third run one of the fake players will be free-riding since the 
beginning. Again, during the debriefing the participant will be informed about the 
manipulation of the fake players. 
○ Volunteer’s Dilemma (VD) 
The Volunteer’s Dilemma mimics a perfect “real-life” interaction of free-riding, that 
is, in this game, players have either to volunteer, either to avoid paying a certain amount 
of money. If they defect, they become free-riders, also called as opportunists, since they 
take advantage on other people’s losses. 
The Volunteer’s Dilemma, in its original form, encompasses scenarios that trap 
the participant in a dilemma: if s/he volunteers, s/he will have some cost and the group 
will have some benefit; if s/he does not volunteers then, someone else would have to 
volunteer in order for the group to get the benefit; otherwise, all the elements of the group 
will suffer some sort of punishment (Diekmann, 1985; Goeree, Holt, & Smith, 2017). One 
of these scenarios is: due to a failure, electricity has gone in the neighbourhood; 
everyone knows that if somebody gives a phone call, the failure will be repaired, and 
electricity will return again; the phone call, however, has a cost and its cost is to be 
assumed by the caller; the participant has to make a decision: either s/he volunteers and 
assumes the cost, or waits that somebody else makes the call; in this case, s/he benefits 
from the public good at no cost. 
1.7. Addressing Game Theory with Neuroscience 
One of the first pioneers in this field, Nalini Ambady (PhD) found that, even under 
the same stimulus, some people might activate their brain regions differently (Chiao & 
Ambady, 2007; Chiao et al., 2008). For instance, the study conducted between Japanese 
and Americans using silhouettes of bodies in submissive or dominant postures showed 
that Japanese responded better to the submissive postures than Americans, who 
responded better in response to dominant silhouettes. Thus, this study allowed the 
researchers to see cultural differences at the same time they were studying the brain’s 
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circuitry (reward circuitry, in the brain’s limbic system) using event-related potentials 
(ERP) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  
Moreover, Denise Park proposed that cultures may perceive the world differently 
and that those are seen in the brain (Park & Huang, 2012). Therefore, using Chinese 
versus Americans tested with fMRI, she found that under congruent environment (e.g. 
giraffe on a savanna) versus incongruent environment (e.g. giraffe on a football field), 
Chinese were more sensitive to the background than Americans, which sustains 
previous findings, i.e., that Chinese come from a collectivist culture, where the context 
of things is valued, while Americans come from an individual culture were the context 
seems to not “affect” them, as opposite to detail. These findings were associated with 
different activations in the Ventral Visual Cortex (VVC) which is connected with 
perceptual processing. 
These two pioneer investigations are perfect examples of how this field needs to 
be deeply explored, since it demonstrated that the same cognitive task was performed 
differently across cultures at a neurobiological level. For instance, they might explain the 
reason why some cultures appear to be more skilled than others, but more importantly 
they show that the cultural influence may play a very keen role on the neuroplasticity of 
brain functions.  
Now, with these discoveries, combined with the findings obtained in Lopes (2014) 
and other studies that were used to analyse human behaviour in decision-making 
processes (Chung, Yun, & Jeong, 2015; de Quervain et al., 2004; Lee, 2008; Polezzi et 
al., 2008; Pulford, Krockow, Colman, & Lawrence, 2016; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), we might be able to create new constructs and paradigms 
that will be more suitable to distinguish cultural facets (more specifically,  of the economic 
behaviour) that may play a crucial role in each country. 
According to another pioneer of Cultural Neuroscience, John Gabrieli, "everyone 
uses the same attention machinery for more difficult cognitive tasks, but they are trained 
to use it in different ways, and it's the culture that does the training" (retrieved from 
http://news.mit.edu/2008/psychology-0111).    
Park also said that "Understanding cultural differences in the mind is really 
important as the world globalizes" and that "There can be a lot of breakdowns in 
communication" (both retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/health/04iht-
6sncult.1.10695876.html). 
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1.7.1 The use of the Electroencephalography technique 
For this research, we decided to use Electroencephalography as the 
neuroimaging technique and Game Theory as the tool to assess how Portugal and 
Ireland behave during luck and economic-based decisions.  
The reason for using EEG is because it is a non-invasive technique; it allows to 
record and amplify electrical voltage currents across the scalp and to plot this over time 
(offering a better temporal resolution of the neural electrical activity when compared with 
other neuroimaging techniques, such as the fMRI and PET, for example); it offers little 
discomfort for the participants (plus, the meal restrictions of MRI techniques do not apply 
to EEG testing) and has a relatively low cost when compared to fMRI, for instance (Luck, 
2014). 
EEG-recorded Event-related potential (ERP) analysis is one of the most used 
methods in cognitive neuroscience to non-invasively examine the neural correlates of 
information processing (Nidal & Malik, 2015). 
The ERPs  waveforms are embedded in the EEG signal and can be extracted by 
event-locking the EEG signal to a stimulus or feedback event, and averaging this across 
trials (Luck, 2014). These averaged waveforms across trials are then averaged across 
participants, in order to obtain a Grand Average ERP waveform that reveals the temporal 
changes in the equivalent current dipole, and that is plotted in microvolts (µV), over time 
(ms).  
ERPs components are useful for determining the millisecond-to-millisecond 
stages of information is processing in the brain, proving to be an excellent tool of 
temporal resolution for many sensory, perceptual and cognitive processes (Nunez & 
Srinivasan, 2006; Woodman, 2010). These components can present a positive or 
negative voltage deflection  that are labelled with P and N, respectively, followed by a 
numerical indication of the order or time (in milliseconds) of the peak in the waveform 
sequence (e.g. N1/N100, P1/P100, N2/N200, etc.) (Woodman, 2010). 
1.8. Cultural settings between Ireland and Portugal: Economic 
Review 
 Both countries faced an economic crisis in 2010 and 2011, respectively, and 
although they both exited the bailout programme, their economic performance trajectory 
is different, suggesting they addressed the crisis problem differently. 
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For Portugal, “economic success came after relinquishing the austerity 
straitjacket imposed by the EU and International Monetary Fund between 2011 and 
2014. Public sector wages and pensions have been restored to pre-crisis levels, but the 
government is likely to face future conflict with the EU, as Brussels seeks action to reduce 
Portugal’s debts”, while “Ireland’s exchequer remains highly dependent on a few large 
companies, leaving the economy in a vulnerable position” (retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/16/weakest-eurozone-portugal-
ireland-spain-italy).  
In 2010, Ireland faced an economic crisis and had to ask for help to the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “The 
country received an emergency loan of 68 billion euros. Many banks were nationalized. 
The government introduced austerity measures and reorganized public finances. The 
salaries of officials and social benefits were cut, and taxes increased. Today, Ireland is 
regarded as a model of success in overcoming a financial crisis using austerity 
measures. In 2014, economic growth amounted to 5 percent — a record for the entire 
European Union. Today, Ireland’s GDP has almost reached pre-crisis levels” (retrieved 
from https://sputniknews.com/europe/201507051024235988/). 
On the other hand, in 2011, Portugal received a loan from “the Eurozone 
countries and became the third recipient of financial assistance from the European 
stabilization funds. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF allocated 78 billion 
euros to support Portugal. In return, Lisbon lowered the salaries of state employees, cut 
social benefits and increased taxes” (retrieved from 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/201507051024235988/). 
Even though it was not well received by the Portuguese residents, the economy 
grew almost 0.9% for the first time. “The government is promising to continue reforms, 
but the situation is complicated due to demographic challenges, particularly, the aging 
population. Portugal ranks last in Western Europe in terms of welfare indicators” 
(retrieved from https://sputniknews.com/europe/201507051024235988/). 
According to Deutsche Welle, Ireland and Portugal were two of the three 
countries that were able to overcome the economic crisis, avoiding bankruptcy. None of 
this would have been possible without the help of the EU countries and funding 
programs.
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Chapter II 
Methods 
2.1. Guidelines for cultural neuroscience studies 
Before playing the games, a photo of the participant is taken, and s/he is informed that similar photos were taken from the other participants 
and that the decisions that each one makes will figure next to the photo on the screen. Although the photo is discarded, this procedure is to induce 
a context of reality (Hewig et al., 2011), so the participant believes that s/he is playing against other humans and not with the computer, nor start 
imagining that the counterparts’ decisions are in fact previously manipulated, except for the Rock – Paper – Scissors game. Also, all participants 
play the Ultimatum Game twice: once as a proposer when only the behavioural data is recorded, not the EEG signals; and once as a receiver, 
here recording both the behavioural decisions and the EEG, as further detailed. The reason for such a procedure is the same, i.e., to induce a 
context of reality for the participants so they believe that are playing against other humans. 
The participants were also given a set of instructions (cf. Appendix XII and XIII for the English and Portuguese version, respectively), as well 
as the opportunity to practise before the experiment started, to get familiar with the games’ procedure. The order of the games was randomised 
across participants (cf. Appendix XIV), except for the Rock-Paper-Scissors, which was always played first. 
However, due to the difficulty of describing what culture is and what elements should be involved in that definition, it is fundamental to follow 
certain rules or guidelines as to “trim the edges” and obtain more accurate and, mainly, interpretable results as possible. Losin et al. (2010) 
summarised eight guidelines, which divided into three major groups. This research plenty adhered to these guidelines. 
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Table 2.1 – Guidelines and definitions for cultural neuroscience studies, based on the ones proposed by Losin et al. (2010). 
 
Related to 
Guidelines Meaning Measure(s) used 
 
Selection of 
cultures 
 
1. Define and measure culture 
 
 
The same definition needs to be used for 
all the elements of the study in order to 
ensure conceptual consistency.  
Measure of enculturation versus 
acculturation were used, creating for that 
purpose, an instrument to assess the level 
of these bidimensional definitions for each 
of the countries (cf. Appendixes VIII and 
IX, i.e., IPEAS, available in the English 
and Portuguese version). 
 
2. Unpackage culture 
 
It is related with the psychological 
constructs that define one specific culture, 
which should be identified; such 
constructs should be the base of 
separation of cultures and therefore, 
should be used to select cultural groups; 
even more, these constructs must be 
measured in each participant. 
 
These constructs and measures are 
presented in IPEAS and also in the games 
used, being a perfect example of how 
different the level of competition / 
cooperation / freeriding across different 
cultures can be, while playing the same 
game. 
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3. Replicate cultures containing 
cultural elements of interest 
 
 
The authors suggest using three different 
cultures, at least, as a term of comparison; 
further, the effects should be replicated in 
other cultures, so causal relations can be 
established. 
 
This study was based by a previous study 
conducted by Lopes et al. (2014), using 
Finnish and Portuguese people as a term 
of comparison, while observing their 
performance on similar economic games. 
 
Participant-
specific elements 
of cultural groups 
selected 
 
 
4. Match or measure 
onset/amount of cultural 
experience 
 
The age of the participant at the onset of 
the cultural experience and the duration of 
the cultural experience of the participant is 
related to neural plasticity and therefore, 
have impact in cultural neuroscience 
studies; because these variables are of 
paramount importance in these studies, 
both should be measured in the cohorts, 
and even matched.  
 
Only participants aged between 18-50 
years old were used for this study (Mage = 
25.53; SD =7.62 for the Portuguese study 
and Mage =24.80; SD = 7.35 for the Irish 
study). Besides, the games used for this 
research study were identical. 
 
 
5. Consider the effects of 
regional genetic variation 
 
Genetic heritage and culture are often 
confounded; in order to separate each 
contribution to cross-cultural neural 
 
Based on the fact our study addresses 
Portuguese and Irish native people, this 
recommendation will not be fulfilled as we 
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differences it is recommended that a third 
group, this one containing shared genetic 
heritage, but different cultural experience; 
for instance, if A and B are two distinct 
cultural groups with dissimilar genetic 
heritage, a third group, e.g. Elements of B 
that changed to the culture of A, should be 
included. 
 
are not including immigrants in this 
research. 
 
6. Match groups 
 
Besides the cultural constructs, the other 
factors must match among cohorts. 
 
 
A set of criteria (inclusion and exclusion) 
were used in order to refine and screen 
the collected sample. For instances, all 
participants that had a MoCA score below 
26 were dismissed from the study. 
 
The features of the 
experimental 
stimuli used 
 
7. Equate stimuli 
 
Stimuli should be equated among the 
cultural groups under study; however, 
equating is not being the same, and some 
adaptations / compensations should be 
introduced in order to reach an ideal 
balance. 
 
 
In order to ensure that during the analysis 
all conditions would be equally balanced, 
we decided to introduce the Purchase 
Power Parity (also known as PPP) as an 
indicator of the cost of living and income 
of each country, so that we would 
introduce a real value into the final stake 
offered to participants during the 
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Ultimatum Game, for instance (e.g., Big 
Mac Index). 
 
8. Equate performance 
Similarly, the performance among the 
cultural groups should be balanced, so its 
effects, which supposedly are not 
culturally grounded, are discounted.  
The games were identical in their structure 
and duration (except for the language and 
photos of fake opponents). 
 
 
Losin et al. (2010) firmly believe that Cultural Neuroscience is not only additive, since it can bring a lot of tools to understand how the neuroplasticity of 
the human brain co-varies across different cultures, but also that it is synergistic, since some of the findings may be different from those made so far in this field. 
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2.2. Experimental Protocols 
2.2.1. Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) 
The original format of the game is maintained, differing only on the basis that it is 
played against a computer instead of a person. Therefore, each player chooses among 
rock, paper or scissors and depending on the computer’s choice, they may win, draw or 
lose (the payoff matrix figures in Table 2.2).  
Each participant plays for 90 trials and, most importantly, all participants are informed 
that they are playing against a computer, which will generate its own random choices. 
The rationale for using this game is to collect data free from social interactions as 
much as possible, given that luck is not influenced by culture, but mostly to ensure that 
the collected data from the two sites is equivalent and does not introduce noise in the 
EEG signal.  
 
Table 2.2 – Payoff matrix of the game in which two players must choose simultaneously 
between three different options (Rock, Paper or Scissors).  
 
 
 
 
 
The detailed sequence in each trial is (cf. Figure 2.1): 
1. the participant chooses among rock, paper or scissors (slide 1); 
2. a slide with the participant’s response is displayed for 1.5 seconds (slide 2); 
3. then, the computer’s response is displayed for 1.5 seconds (slide 3); 
4. after that, a slide that shows the result for 1 second (slide 4); 
5. follows a fixation cross for 1.5 seconds (slide 5); 
6. end of the trial. 
           Computer 
Player 1 
Rock Paper Scissors 
Rock 0,0 -1,1 1, -1 
Paper 1, -1 0,0 -1, 1 
Scissors -1, 1 1, -1 0,0 
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Figure 2.1 – Example of an individual trial with the three different options available (i.e., 
1 for rock, 2 for paper and 3 for scissors), as well as the computer’s response (which is 
randomised across trials) and the outcome from both choices (i.e., win/draw/lose). 
2.2.2. Ultimatum Game (UG) 
The participation of the individual in the Ultimatum Game is split in two parts: firstly, 
s/he decides as proposer (no EEG recording), and then s/he decides as receiver (with 
EEG recording). Again, the original structure of the game was maintained (Hewig et al., 
2011; Polezzi et al., 2008; Qu et al., 2013; Crockett et al, 2008; Civai et al., 2010). 
In this game, the amount of money may be an issue, because of the difference in the 
cost of living in the two countries. Thus, the Purchasing Power Parity, also known as 
PPP, was used as a benchmark indicator, as it takes into account the cost of living and 
income of each country, being widely used by macroeconomists to help them to estimate 
the global productivity and growth of each country.  
One  reference used with PPP is the BigMac price (retrieved from 
www.economist.com/content/big-mac-index), which costs 3.2 € in Portugal and 4.1 € in 
Ireland. Considering that in this game participants are able to offer at least half of the 
value they receive, to their opponent, the value for the final stake in the Portuguese case 
was 12 € maximum (in which, half would correspond to two BigMacs). In order to have 
a more accurate proportion for the final stake in the Irish version of this game, the PPP 
had to be addressed as an indicator. 
The PPP is measured according to the national US currency (dollar), corresponding 
to: 
a) 0.6 / 1 (*) dollar for Portugal; 
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b) 0.8 / 1 (*) dollar for Ireland; 
c) Dividing the two rates in a) and b): 
0.8 / 0.6 = 1.3 
d) Dividing the two BigMac prices: 
4.1 € / 3.2 € = 1.3 
(*) These values were retrieved from https://data.oecd.org/conversion/purchasing-power-
parities-ppp.htm for the year of 2017. 
 The option here is to use two BigMacs as the initial lump of money, i.e., 12 € in 
Portugal, and 16 € in Ireland. 
 
 
  
 
 
 Also, the proposer is able to share 50% of his/her amount of money, at most. This 
means that in Portugal the maximum amount to be sent to the receiver is 6 €, and in 
Ireland is 8€: 
- a proposer and a receiver play against each other; 
- the proposer has an initial amount of money; 
- the proposer decides how to divide the amount of money between the two 
players; 
- the receiver player can either accept or reject the proposal, 
- if the receiver rejects the offer, then neither player wins money; if the receiver 
accepts the offer, then the money is split according to the proposal (Barr et al., 
2009). 
The detailed sequence in each trial, when the participant plays as proposer, is: 
1. the first slide just shows the photo of the opponent; 
2. in the second slide, the proponent must decide the amount to be shared among 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 € (Portugal), pressing the respective key or 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 
8 € (Ireland); 
3. end of the trial; this trial is played 20 times. 
12€ -------------0,6 
x---------------0,8 
x = 16€ 
 
12€ ----------------3,20€ 
y------------------4,10€ 
y = 15, 375€ ≈ 16€ 
 
OR  
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The detailed sequence in each trial, when the participant plays as receiver, is: 
1. according to Table 2.3 there are six different offer possibilities; the first slide 
shows the one elected for the trial; a circle proportionally divided depicts the 
amount offered by the proposer (and the corresponding amount in euros); each 
part of the division is depicted with different colours: blue for the part that the 
participant receives if accepts the proposal, and red for the proposer; 
2. the participant either accepts or rejects the proposal made by pressing two 
different keys on the keyboard; 
3. a feedback slide of each round is displayed at the end of each trial showing the 
players payoff (Vieira et.al, 2014); 
4. each offer is repeated 20 times, resulting on a total of 120 trials, plus 6 and 12 
trials (behavioural only), where the participant has to classify each offer and 
each proposer who made the offer as very unfair to very fair, respectively (on a 
scale from 1 to 5, 1 being very unfair and 5 very fair); 
5. offers are classified as unfair if the value is 1 € / 2 €, as mid-value if the offer is 4 
€ / 5 €, and as fair if the offer is 7 € / 8 € (case of Ireland); and as unfair if the 
value is 1 € / 2 €, as mid-value if the offer is 3 € / 4 €, and finally, fair if the offer 
is 5 € /6 € (case of Portugal); 
6. The receiver (our participant) has the opportunity to reject offers made; 
7. The offers were manipulated but balanced across all participants; 
8. Every time the participant won, s/he collected points for him/herself, because 
previously s/he was informed that there is a real prize in the end for the three 
participants than make more points. This incentive is important, so the participant 
do not punish at no cost, which would be irrelevant. 
 
Table 2.3 - Different splits of money and respective payoff between the proposer 
(computer, player A) and the receiver (participant, player B) in the UG. 
If Player A gives Player A receives Player A’s payoff Player B’s payoff 
                                    CASE OF IRELAND 
€ 1 € 15 € 13 € 1 
€ 2 € 14 € 12 € 2 
€ 4 € 12 € 11 € 4 
€ 5 € 11 € 10 € 5 
€ 7 € 9 € 9 € 7 
€ 8 € 8 € 8 € 8 
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The detailed sequence in each trial is (cf. Figure 2.2): 
i) Each trial started with the photo of the proposer for 1.5 seconds; 
ii)  Presentation of a colour circle showing the proposal made by the 
proposer (in red) to the participant (in blue) for 1.5 seconds; 
iii) The participant gives his/her answer, after seeing the proposal;  
iv) A slide showing the answer is displayed during 1 second; 
v) A fixation cross was displayed within 1 second; 
vi) End of the trial. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Example of an individual trial in the UG. It starts the photo of the fake 
opponent and then with a colour circle showing the proposal made by the proposer (in 
red) to the participant (in blue). After the participant chooses to accept or reject the offer, 
a slide showing the answer appears on the screen.  
2.2.3. Centipede Game (CG) 
This game is played according to Aumann’s version (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992): 
                                         CASE OF PORTUGAL 
€ 1 € 11 € 11 € 1 
€ 2 € 10 € 10 € 2 
€ 3 € 9 € 9 € 3 
€ 4 € 8 € 8 € 4 
€ 5 € 7 € 7 € 5 
€ 6 € 6 € 6 € 6 
 32 
 
- the participants play against a fake opponent in every round, although they are 
told the opposite at the beginning of the experiment (there is a photo of the 
fictitious player showing up on the screen, even though all the moves are 
programmed by a computer); 
- the game begins with one of the players passing a pot with a certain value inside; 
- the initial pot has an initial amount of 1 € and every time the pot pass from one 
player to the other, the amount of money increases by another 1 € (cf. Table 2.4); 
- in each turn, each player makes the decision: takes the amount from the pot for 
him/herself, or just passes the pot to the other player, now with increasing value, 
giving to the other the possibility of keeping the larger amount; 
- this sequence (trial) is played in nine rounds, each encompassing 10 trials, in 
which they were organised in three different groups, i.e., cooperative, midriding 
and freeriding groups: 
-  During three rounds (in a total of 30 trials), cooperation is promoted, i.e., the 
opponent gives back the pot; 
-  in another three rounds (also in a total of 30 trials), the opposite player firstly 
cooperates, and then starts to keep the bigger pot for him/her precociously (in 
the 5th trial, the opponent starts to freeride instead of cooperating); 
- finally, the opponent takes the selfish decision from the beginning for three 
rounds as well (again, with 30 trials overall). 
- the order of these nine rounds types is randomised across the participants. 
 
 
Number of the trial Value inside of the pot 
1 1 € 
2 2 € 
3 3 € 
4 4 € 
5 5 € 
6 6 € 
7 7 € 
Table 2.4 – Payoff matrix in the Centipede Game. The person that takes the pot, receives 
the amount. 
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The detailed sequence in each trial is (cf. Figure 2.3): 
1. each trial starts with one pot and the payoff according to Table 2.4 (slide 1); 
2. then, the participant chooses either to pass the pot, or to take the amount to 
him/herself by pressing the correspondent key (slide 2); 
3. after the decision, a fixation cross is displayed on the screen for 1.5 seconds 
(slide 3); 
4. the next pot is presented for 1.5 seconds with the respective value inside (i.e., if 
the participant took the amount from the pot on the previous trial, then the value 
starts with 1 € again on the next one. If the participant passes the pot, the value 
rises by another euro, in accordance to the amount that was presented in the last 
trial). 
5.  A photo of the fake opponent is displayed for 2 seconds showing his/her move 
(slide 4); 
6. another fixation cross is displayed for 1.5 seconds (slide 6); 
7. end of the trial. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Sequence of three trials between the participant and the opponent. 
2.2.4. Public Goods Game (PGG) 
This game is played according to the standard condition in Chung et al. (2015), which 
is the condition that maximises freeriding. In this condition, there is no payback if at least 
two players do not cooperate with the group, i.e., if the group fails, no one receives the 
money (i.e., the ones who cooperated), while the free riders receive 5 €. Then: 
- the participant and four other fictitious players make the playing pool; 
8 8 € 
9 9 € 
10 10 € 
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- each player has two types of tokens: 5 € and 0 €; 
- secretly, each player chooses which token to put into a public pot (see Table 2.5); 
- if at least three players invest with the 5 € token, the sum of the tokens in this pot 
is multiplied by a factor (greater than 1) and this "public good" payoff is evenly 
divided among players; each participant also keeps the tokens they did not 
contribute (Croson, 2007; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fischbacher et al., 2001); 
- if more than two players invest the 0 € token, those that invest the 5 € token lose 
their investment; 
- it is played in nine rounds; each round has three different playing pools; 
- each round consists of 10 trials; 
o in one round, the fictitious players promote cooperation, participating 
intensively with tokens and maximizing the earnings of the group; 
o in another round, one of the fictitious players suddenly adopts a freeriding 
posture by the 5th trial, by investing nothing in the public pot; 
o  in the remaining round, at least two of the fictitious players freerides since 
the beginning; 
 
 Success Failure 
Cooperation 10€ 0€ 
Freeriding 15€ 5€ 
 
The detailed sequence in each trial is (cf. Figure 2.4): 
1. the participant chooses one token by pressing the respective key: 5 € or 0 € (slide 
1); 
2. a slide showing the result of the group is displayed for 3 seconds (slide 2); 
3. after the group’s decision, a fixation cross is displayed on the screen for 1 second 
(slide 3); 
4. a fourth slide showing the final amount won by the participant is displayed on the 
screen for 1.5 seconds. In the example below, if the participant was cooperative 
towards the group, s/he wins 10 €; if the participant does not contribute towards 
the group, i.e., if the participant freerides, then s/he wins 15 €; 
5. another fixation cross is displayed for 1 seconds (slide 5); 
Table 2.5 – Payoff matrix using the CondS in the PGG according to Chung et al. (2015). 
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6. a final slide showing the group’s result. In the example from Figure 4, if the 
participant cooperates, then everyone wins the same amount (10 €), if the 
participant freerides, then s/he wins 15 €, while the other four players only receive 
10 € (slide 6); 
7. end of the trial. 
 
Figure 2.4 – Example of an individual trial from the cooperative round. In this type of 
round, the group is intensively cooperating, so that the outcome will only be affected by 
the participant decisions.  
2.2.5. Volunteer’s Dilemma (VD) 
- A typical scenario in the Volunteer’s Dilemma is (Diekmann, 1985; Goeree, Holt, 
& Smith, 2017): due to a failure, electricity has gone in the neighbourhood; 
everyone knows that if somebody gives a phone call the failure will be repaired, 
and electricity will return again; the phone call, however, has a cost and its cost 
is to be assumed by the caller.  
- The participant has to make a decision: or volunteers and assumes the cost or 
waits that somebody else makes the call. If s/he does not assume the cost and 
someone else does, then s/he benefits from the public good at no cost. This 
manipulation is made, in order to assess the “opportunistic immobility” either in 
small groups, and in larger, i.e., inducing selfish decisions. 
 
For this study, the original construct of the game (Diekmann, 1985) was mimicked and 
adapted to an economic scenario (Goeree, Holt, & Smith, 2017), in which: 
- Each participant must make (covertly) the decision: to choose 1 cent or to choose 
€1. 
- If at least one player chooses 1 cent (volunteers and assumes the cost), then 
everyone gets the amount chosen, otherwise, no one gets anything.  
- The game has a total of 65 trials. 
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Table 2.6 - Payoff matrix between the participants and the players in the VD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The detailed sequence in each trial is (cf. Figure 2.5): 
1. Each trial started with a decision between €1 and 1 cent in which 
the participant must choose either to give 1 cent or to keep the 
money to him/herself by pressing the correspondent key; 
2. A slide showing the result of the group is displayed for 3 seconds; 
3. The outcome is displayed on the third slide for 2 seconds. If at 
least one player, including the participant, volunteers with 1 cent 
towards the group, then everyone keeps the amount they initially 
chose. If no one does that, i.e., if no one volunteers and everyone 
wants to keep 1 € for themselves, then no one wins; 
4. A fixation cross is displayed on the screen for 1 second; 
5. End of the trial. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – Example of an individual trial. 
Participant versus 
Players 
If the participant 
volunteers (gives 1 
cent) 
If the participant 
does not volunteer 
(keeps 1€) 
If at least one player 
volunteers 
1,1 1,0 
If no players 
volunteer 
1,0 0,0 
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2.3. EEG apparatus 
This research took into account the recommendations and limits mentioned in 
Gilmore (1994) and Light et al. (2010) concerning the EEG acquisitions best practices 
and safety. 
The experiments were conducted in the Neuropsychology Laboratory, Faculty of 
Psychology and Education Sciences, University of Porto, Portugal (see, Figure 2.6), and 
in the Psychology EEG Laboratory of the School of Nursing and Human Sciences, 
Faculty of Science and Health, Dublin City University, Ireland (see, Figures 2.7 and 2.8). 
The two EEG devices were not totally equivalent, even though they had both 32 active 
electrodes (10/20 system), covering the whole scalp (see, Figure 2.9), however, the 
acquisitions parameters (described in more detail in section 2.5. Data acquisition) were 
matched as closely as possible. 
 
Figure 2.6- Setup of the Neuropsychology Lab at the Faculty of Psychology and 
Education Sciences, University of Porto. 1- Room for the participant. 2,3- Amplifier. 4- 
EEG cap (Note: EEG cap references (ANT system) used: 211091, 211092 and 211093. 
All uni-size Ag/AgCl caps). 5- Recording room. 6- Electroconductive gel (left), Nuprep 
gel for scrubbing (upper left), alcohol, cotton pads and syringes with blunt tip (bottom 
right).  
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Figure 2.7- Setup of the EEG Lab at the Psychology Department at the SNHS at DCU. 
A- Battery and amplifier from Maynooth (left) and battery and amplifier from DCU (right). 
B- Electrically sheltered room for the participants. C- Recording room. D- Electrode 
washers. E, F, G, H- Electrodes. I- Syringes. J- Two batteries from Maynooth University. 
K- Electrode gel.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8- EEG caps from Maynooth University (Ag/AgCl caps) (from L to O, differing 
in size, i.e., from LARGE/MEDIUM, LARGE to SMALL, respectively(*)) and from DCU (P).  
(*) Head circumference electro-cap International, Inc. Eaton, Ohio 45320 USA (Biosemi): 
Large Size (blue cap): 58-62 cm 
Large / medium (purple and red cap): 56-60 cm 
Medium / small (yellow and red cap): 52-56 cm 
 
 
Figure 2.9 - Schematic positioning of electrodes in the 32-channel EEG used in Porto 
(right) and in Dublin (left). The images were retrieved directly through the EEGLab 
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software (left) and https://www.biosemi.com/pics/cap_32_layout_medium.jpg (right), 
respectively. 
Thus, to solve this issue, four electrodes had to be eliminated from both caps. 
M1, M2, Fpz, POz were eliminated from the Portuguese EEG cap and AF3, AF4, PO3, 
PO4 from the Irish one (see, Figure 2.10). Moreover, an elp. file, used to read head 
coordinates of each electrodes, was created, so that the conditions during the analysis 
would be the same on both sites. 
Figure 2.10 – Electrodes eliminated from the Portuguese EEG cap (right) and from the 
Irish one (left). 
2.4. Participant Recruitment and Ethical Approval 
After having received approval by the Ethics Committees from Ireland and 
Portugal (cf. Appendix II and III, respectively) a total of 35 participants from Portugal (17 
males and 18 females) and 31 participants from Ireland (13 males and 18 females) were 
recruited (for further information on the participants that were dismissed with the 
justification for the dismissal, please, cf. Appendix XVI), in order to account with the 
enculturation / acculturation instrument (cf. Appendixes VIII and IX, i.e., IPEAS) 
screening, or technical difficulties during the EEG acquisition. Also, in order to screen 
participants that may suffer from mild cognitive impairment, the Montreal Cognitive 
Assessment (MoCA) (https://www.mocatest.org/splash/), version 7.1, was also applied, 
as well as the Handedness Questionnaire (cf. Appendixes IV and V).  If participants did 
not meet the inclusion and exclusion criteria or failed the right handedness test / IPEAS 
/ MoCA, they were dismissed before the study would take place (cf. Appendix XVI). 
The recruitment was through emails sent by a neutral person of the research 
study, as well as posters in strategic places around the University campuses and other 
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public places. Also, posts on social media were used, in order to disseminate the call for 
participation. 
The participants were selected according to a list of several inclusion / exclusion 
criteria that helped in screening the participants of this study. Therefore, the inclusion 
criteria were:  
- aged between 18 and 50 years old;  
- English as first language (in Ireland) / Portuguese as the first language (in 
Portugal);  
- Irish natives in Ireland (and Portuguese natives in Portugal) and must been living 
in full term in the country of origin (i.e., travel abroad only for short terms, e.g., on 
vacation);  
- right handed. 
Moreover, the exclusion criteria were:  
- personal history or diagnosis of neurologic or psychiatric disorders;  
- taking medication that influence or change the behaviour;  
- recent excessive consumption of alcohol; 
- consumption of drugs at a pace that could disturb behaviour; 
- pregnancy or breast-feeding; 
- any sort of lesion in the scalp; 
- actual or future student of any of the researchers. 
Recently published studies using EEG and games from the GT recruited between 
20 and 26 participants (Chung et al., 2015; Qu, Wang, & Huang, 2013; Wu, Leliveld, & 
Zhou, 2011). Hence, this research includes two cohorts, one representing the Irish 
culture and the other one representing the Portuguese culture, of similar size. 
The participants were paid for their time (15 € in a gift card). Also, in order to prompt 
participants to compete in the games, the three participants that earned more points in 
the games received an extra 30 € prize (in a gift card, too). This is to induce a context of 
reality in the participants, so they believe they are competing against other participants. 
Therefore, each session with the participants began with the confirmation of the 
inclusion criteria and a small brief about the study’s requirement  (cf. Appendixes  VI and 
VII with the Informed Consent, X and XI with the Plain Language Statement), as well as 
the collection of sociodemographic and neurocognitive information (cf. Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.7 – Sociodemographic information and means (and standard deviations) of 
neurocognitive measures (*). 
(*) Measures were obtained after performing an independent- measures- t- test for each factor, 
while using the IBM SPSS© (version 24). 
2.4.1. MoCA, The Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
This test is commonly used to screen participants that may suffer from mild 
cognitive impairment (https://www.mocatest.org/splash/), available in the English and 
Portuguese version). 
It consists of a one-page test that lasts approximately thirty minutes, depending 
on the participant, and that assesses different cognitive domains, such as: 
1. executive functions (alternating trail making) and visuoconstructional skills 
(drawing a cube and a clock); 
2. language (naming the animals that are on the pictures; sentence repetition; 
verbal fluency); 
3. memory (remembering a list of five words at the end of the test); 
4. attention (forward and backward digit span; vigilance; serial subtraction); 
5. orientation (asking the participant to name the date, place and city where the test 
is taking place). 
It is quoted from 0 to 30 points, 26 being considered as normal.  
Measure (*) Portuguese 
(group 1) 
Irish 
(group 2) 
Group comparison 
 t p 
N 30 30 - - 
Gender (n male / n female) 15/15 13/17 - - 
Age 25.5 (7.61) 23.9 (6.83) 0.856 .395 
MoCA 27.9 (1.19) 28.3 (1.49) -0.907 .368 
HQ 95.5 (9.13) 93.0 (9.52) 1.038 .304 
IPEAS (regarding the 
questions involving the 
native culture) 
 
89.6 (7.18) 
 
88.3 (9.85) 
 
0.599 
 
.552 
IPEAS (regarding the 
questions involving 
another culture) 
 
4.3 (6.78) 
 
 
5.3 (7.76) 
 
-0.531 
 
.597 
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All participants that got a score underneath this value, were dismissed from the study 
(cf. Appendix XVI).   
 2.4.2. Handedness Questionnaire (HQ) 
The test uses a percentage scale that helps to determine the dominance of a 
person’s hand (cf. Appendix IV and V, available in the English and Portuguese version, 
respectively). 
 It consists of a small survey, in which participants are asked different daily tasks, 
and they have to choose the hand they use to perform the specific task. 
 All participants with a percentage below 65% were dismissed from this study, 
since the test was performed by the participant’s self-evaluation and not by an 
observation of the participant performing the tasks (cf. Appendix XVI). 
 2.4.3. IPEAS, Irish-Portuguese Enculturation / Acculturation 
Survey 
The IPEAS (cf. Appendix VIII and IX, available in the English and Portuguese 
version, respectively) is an adapted version based on the Vancouver Index of 
Acculturation (VIA) (Tieu & Konnert, 2014) and the Enculturation Scale for Filipino 
Americans (ESFA) (Prado & Church, 2010).  
VIA uses a bidimensional measure by evaluating both the enculturation and 
acculturation dimensions as two distinct constructs, enabling to understand how people 
adapt to new traditions, values, language, etc., by assessing how their heritage culture 
(no matter if it belongs to the culture that the person was born or raised, or if it is from 
the family’s background) has been affected.  
On the other hand, ESFA uses measures of enculturation by creating a scale to 
analyse three general dimensions, such as Connection with Homeland, Interpersonal 
Norms, and Conservatism (Prado & Church, 2010). The idea is to differentiate the 
concepts as two different dimensions, in order to obtain a more accurate measurement 
on how the Filipino Americans had retained and/or learned values, beliefs, traditions, 
etc., from their heritage culture. 
Therefore, for this study, a total of 20 questions addressing cultural aspects of 
each country (10 questions per country) was created to assess the enculturation and/or 
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acculturation level of the participants (cf. Appendix XVI, for further details on the score 
obtained by each participant). 
2.5. Data acquisition  
The recording session involved about 15-20 minutes for electrode application, 
followed by the introduction to the instructions (cf. Appendix XII and XIII, available in the 
English and Portuguese version, respectively) and practise blocks of each game, which 
took about 30-40 minutes overall. Participants were implicated in the acquisition session 
for about 1 hour. Frequent breaks were interspersed during the experiment (e.g. between 
the games), to ensure minor or no discomfort of the participants. 
The electrodes were prepared and checked before the experiment started as to 
make sure impedance values were < 5 kΩ sampling. The setup of the external electrodes 
(i.e., EX1, EX2, EX3 and EX4) was made according to the BioSemi ActiveView software 
(see Figure 2.11). Cz was used as the reference electrode during the recording session 
in Ireland, whereas the mastoids were used as the reference electrodes during the 
recording session in Portugal. However, for the analysis purposes, we decided to set the 
reference electrode to Cz. Regarding the recording software, the sampling rate= 1024 
Hz; Low Cutoff Filter = Fixed TC1 Sec (0,16 Hz); High Cutoff Filter = High Cutoff 15Hz. 
Moreover, the epochs for the ERPs analysis (using BESA software, described below) 
were from 200 to 800ms, time-locked to the feedback onset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 - Schematic positioning of the external electrodes. 
As measures of quality, the activity of all the electrodes and all channels was 
systematically checked in order to ensure that they were working properly, i.e., 
electrodes that produced flat line signals, or showed a lot of activity, while the participant 
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was resting, were considered as a bad electrode / channel (see, Appendix XVIII). If there 
were still bad channels remaining, more electrode gel was applied and scrubbing to 
minimize impedances (the last step was only performed for the Portuguese participants, 
as for the Irish EEG caps no skin preparation was required since high electrode 
impedance can be tolerated). Further, every participant was told to avoid eye blinks, and 
tensing muscles in their forehead or jaw, as this would introduce noise into the EEG data. 
After all the electrode signals looked acceptable, the recording session began. 
At the end of each EEG collection, the removal and cleaning of the caps and 
electrodes was performed. Furthermore, the participants were debriefed from the study 
they just participated in and were told that they had played with fake opponents during 
the entire experiment. 
Finally, the participants were paid for their time, with a gift card worth 15 €. The three 
participants that obtained most points received a bonus of 30 € (also, in a gift card). As 
explained in section 2.4, this was introduced to avoid deception from the participants’ 
perspective, but also to prompt them to assume an active posture while playing the 
games, by giving them a context of reality, so they believed they were playing against 
other participants. 
2.5.1. Triggers 
Triggers are timing markers used to delimit an event of interest that occurs at a 
certain stage of the task, being sent from the parallel port to the EEG apparatus. 
Each game was triggered differently (cf. Appendix XV).  
Therefore, for the RPS, the outcome was initially triggered (Win, Draw, Lose); 
however, we also decided to trigger the previous slide, i.e., where the computer’s choice 
is displayed, since at this stage, participants already knew the outcome before the next 
slide would figure on the screen (see, Figure 2.12) 
 
Figure 2.12 – Onset for the outcome (left) and for the computer’s choice (right). 
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 For the UG, the face of the fake participant was triggered, since the intention 
would be to see how the perception of freeriders affects brain function. The condition 
(level of fairness) of each offer was also triggered, in order to understand how people, 
react to fair/unfair offers (see, Figure 2.13). 
 
Figure 2.13 – Onset for the fake participants face (left) and for the offers made (right). 
2.5.2. ERP Components 
The Event-Related-Potentials are important components used to measure the 
earliest stages of information processing of the brain, to a certain event or stimuli within 
a millisecond precision, which can then be compared and/or linked to the behavioural 
responses from the same event or stimuli.  
Unlike other techniques, this procedure is non-invasive, it has a high temporal 
resolution and it is affordable too. However, it requires a large number of time-locked 
experimental trials, in order to obtain a good averaged signal.  
Regarding the ERPs analysed for this study, three feedback-locked event-related 
potentials (ERPs) that play a crucial role in outcome processing (Miltner et al., 1997; 
Martín, 2012; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Donchin and Coles, 1988; Nieuwenhuis, 2011; 
Boksem & De Cremer, 2010; Campanhã, Minati, Fregni, & Boggio, 2011; Osinsky, 
Mussel, Öhrlein, & Hewig, 2013 Gehring & Willoughby, 2002), were examined:  
- The Feedback Related Negativity (FRN) and the P3 in the RPS; 
- The Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN) in the UG. 
Besides, a fourth ERP for neural processing of faces (Kropotov, 2016; Ghuman et al. 
2014) was analysed for the UG:  
- The N170. 
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While the FRN appears to be sensitive to expectancy violations, the P3 appears to 
be sensitive to the arousing nature of the feedback, the MFN seems to be sensitive to 
unfairness and the N170 appears to be an important component for face recognition. 
FRN (Feedback Related Negativity) 
According to the reward prediction error hypothesis (Miltner et al., 1997), the FRN 
is consistently larger for negative than for positive feedbacks (for both monetary and non-
monetary feedbacks) (Martín, 2012), being elicited in the frontal-central region (more 
precisely, in the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) at approximately 200-300ms (with a 
negative deflection), after the feedback onset. Besides, it is also dependent on 
dopaminergic function, which in return also decreases when an outcome is worse than 
expected (Holroyd and Coles, 2002).  
The FRN was measured at Fz, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time 
window of the 220-320ms for the onset placed on the result and for the computer’s 
choice. 
P300 
Even though, the P300 has widespread sources, it is generated in the 
centroparietal region, being elicited at approximately 300 to 600 ms after the feedback 
onset and presenting a positive deflection (Martín, 2012).  
According to the context-updating hypothesis (Donchin and Coles, 1988), the 
P300 catalogs the brain’s activity underlying the revision of the current mental model of 
a certain task, after a stimulus. The mental model is maintained if the stimulus context is 
also preserved, and only sensory potentials are evoked. If a new stimulus is detected, 
the updating of the information in working memory will occur and the P300 will be elicited. 
Therefore, the outcomes associated with higher levels of arousal will generate larger 
P300 amplitudes, reflecting increased allocation of attention (Nieuwenhuis, 2011). 
The P300 was measured at Pz, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time 
window of the 350-450ms. 
MFN (Medial Frontal Negativity) 
The MFN is associated with unfairness sensitivity being elicited by negative 
feedback (e.g. situations of loss of money versus gain of money) and is calculated by 
subtracting the ERP elicited by fair offers from the one elicited by unfair offers (Boksem 
& De Cremer, 2010; Campanhã, Minati, Fregni, & Boggio, 2011; Osinsky, Mussel, 
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Öhrlein, & Hewig, 2013). The MFN is normally elicited at approximately 300 ms after the 
offer onset, appearing to also be generated in the ACC (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002).  
The MFN was measured at Fz, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time 
window of the 250-330ms for the Irish group and 200-280ms for the Portuguese group, 
after the offer onset. 
N170  
The N170 is associated with the encoding of faces, showing a right-hemisphere 
localization (Kropotov, 2016) displayed across the occipital-temporal-parietal regions. 
Ghuman and colleagues (2014) also found a correlation between the fusiform gyrus of 
the temporal cortex with face recognition, while using fMRI.The N170 is elicited at 
approximately 130 to 200ms after the onset of the stimulus presentation, presenting a 
stronger effect on the right side of the scalp (Ghuman et al. 2014; Kropotov, 2016). 
The N170 was measured at P8, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time 
window of the 140-200ms for the Irish group and 120-180ms for the Portuguese group, 
ms after the offer onset. 
Considering the scope of our research study, i.e., to understand how Portuguese 
and Irish people differ (behaviorally and neurobiologically) on a free-riding and/or 
cooperation level, we predict that free-riders will have a larger FRN for negative 
feedbacks (e.g., when they lose) than positive ones. Regarding the P300, we expect that 
free-riders will elicit a higher P300 when the level of arousal is high (in this case, when 
they are winning). Thirdly, for the MFN, we anticipate that free-riders will elicit a higher 
MFN in scenarios in which they are punished by their fake opponent. Finally, we estimate 
that participants will elicit a different N170 when they will be playing against a fake 
opponent that acts as a free-rider when compared with a fake opponent that acts as a 
cooperator. 
2.5.3. E-Prime Software  
E-Prime software offers a very easy and intuitive way to design and analyse 
behavioural paradigms and was used to program all six tasks. 
The Neuropsychophysiology Laboratory at the University of Porto (Portugal) used 
the version 2.0.8.90, while the one used at Dublin City University (Ireland) is more recent, 
i.e., version 2.0.10.252. Even though, the versions were slightly different, this did not 
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affect the collection of the data. The games were identical in their structure and triggers, 
differing only in the language and set of photos (*) of the fake opponents. 
(*) The photos were taken from random students (both in Ireland and in Portugal) 
that did not take part of the study and that gave full consent and approval to use them 
for the purpose of this study. 
2.5.4. ASA Software (ANT System) and Biosemi ActiveView 
Software 
ASA Software (ANT Neuro) offers a high flexibility for cognitive and clinical 
neuroscientific studies, being also compatible with several softwares of analysis such as 
BESA software.  
 It was used to record the brain activity of the Portuguese participants in the 
Neuropsychophysiology of Porto (Portugal).   
The BioSemi ActiveTwo is only used for research purposes, being able to record 
brain signals.  
This recording software was used in the Psychology Department (EGGLab) of 
DCU (Ireland). 
  The electrophysiological data acquired with the ActiveTwo is meant to be used 
within the framework of scientific research. The system is not intended for medical 
applications.  
The system is not certified as a Medical Device as defined in EU directive 
93/42/EEC, Article 1, Sec 2 (a) (European Union), or as defined in the Federal Food 
Drug & Cosmetic (FD&C) Act, Chapter II, Sec 201 (h) (USA).  
 2.5.5. BESA Software 
BESA is widely used software for source analysis and dipole localization in EEG 
and MEG research. BESA Research has been developed based on 30 years’ experience 
in human brain research by the team around Michael Scherg, University of Heidelberg, 
and Patrick Berg, University of Konstanz. 
The version used for this research study was 5.3.1 February 2010. BESA 
Software is not a clinical product, not being adequate for diagnostic procedures. 
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2.6. Statistical Methods and Analysis 
The results of both the behavioural and neurophysiological data were compared 
using the IBM SPSS© (version 24).  
To detect the effects on the feedback type for the neurophysiological analysis, a 
3x2x2 (i.e., 3 different conditions x 2 electrodes x 2 groups)repeated measures ANOVA 
was performed for the RPS and a 2x1x2 (i.e., 2 different conditions x 1 electrode x 2 
groups) repeated measures ANOVA was performed for the UG, with feedback type and 
electrode as within-participants and group (Portuguese participants versus Irish 
participants) as between-participants’ factor. The mean amplitude was chosen as the 
dependent variable for the ERP components. 
For the RPS the feedback type had three factors/levels, i.e., win / draw / lose (if 
the feedback onset was set for the result) or rock/paper/scissors (if the feedback onset 
was set for the computer’s choice), while for the UG the feedback type had only two 
factors/levels, i.e., fair / unfair (independently of the feedback onset being set for the fake 
participant’s face or for the offer made). 
Regarding the behavioural analysis, the choice rates (i.e., percentage of times 
the participant choses an option, in relation to the total number of trials) was calculated 
for each participant. Once again, to see the effects of the choice type/offer type/proposer 
type and reaction times, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with the choice 
type/offer type/proposer type as the within-participants variable and group (Portuguese 
participants versus Irish participants) as the between-participants’ factor. 
The threshold established for all analysis to test statistical significance was set at 
 = .05. Whenever violations of sphericity were detected, the Greenhouse-Geisser 
method was applied (Luck, 2005; Picton et al., 2000). Moreover, significant ANOVA main 
effects were quantified using Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons.  
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Chapter III 
Results 
3.1. Behavioural data 
3.1.1. Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) 
Regarding decision-making results, we did not find a main effect of group, F(1, 
58) = 1.00, p = .321, η2p = .017. However, we found a main effect of choice type, F(2, 
96) = 6.79, p = .003, η2p = .105, ε= 0.870, revealing that, in both groups, Rock was 
significantly more chosen than Paper (p = .008) and Scissors (p = .027). We did not find 
a significant choice*group interaction, F(2, 116) = 0.571, p = .535, η2p = .010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Average rates (%) for the two groups (Portuguese sample on the left and 
Irish one on the right) in the choice made during the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Error 
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
Concerning reaction times, we did not find a main effect of group, F(1, 58) = 
1.260, p = .266, η2p = .021. We also did not find a main effect of choice type, F(2, 89) = 
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1.281, p = .277, η2p = .022, ε= 0.800 and of choice*group interaction, F(2, 116) = 0.300, 
p = .741, η2p = .005. 
3.1.2. Ultimatum Game (UG) and Proposer 
Regarding decision-making results for the UG, we did not find a main effect of 
group, F(1, 58) = 1.00, p = .321, η2p = .017. However, we found a main effect of choice 
type, F(2, 123) = 54.095, p = .001, η2p = .483, ε= 0.425, revealing that, in both groups, 
Fair Accept (i.e., when participants accept a fair offer) > Unfair Reject (i.e., when 
participants reject an unfair offer) > Mid Accept (i.e., when participants accept a mid-
offer) > Mid Reject (i.e., when participants reject a mid-offer) > Unfair Accept Reject (i.e., 
when participants accept an unfair offer) > Fair Reject (i.e., when participants reject a 
fair offer). 
We did not find a significant choice*group interaction, F(2, 123) = 1.454, p = .237, 
η2p = .024. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Average rates (%) for the two groups (Portuguese sample on the left and 
Irish one on the right) in the choice made during the Ultimatum Game. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals.  
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Concerning reaction times, we did not find a main effect of group, F(1, 58) = .072, 
p = .790, η2p = .001. We also did not find a main effect of choice type, F(3, 188) = 2.017, 
p = .108, η2p = .034, ε= 0.647 and of choice*group interaction, F(3, 188) = 0.662, p = 
.587, η2p = .011. 
After the 120 trials, a set of 6 and 12 trials (behavioural only) was displayed, in 
which the participant had to classify each offer and each proposer who made the offer 
as very unfair to very fair, respectively (on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being very unfair and 5 
very fair). Regarding the results for the classification on the offers made during the game, 
we did not find a main effect of group, F(1,58) = 1.294, p = .260, η2p = .022. However, 
we found a main effect of offer type (p = .001), revealing that, in both groups, Fair Offers 
received a higher classification, following the Mid Offers and then the Unfair Offers, 
respectively (cf. Figure 3.3). There was no significant group*offer type interaction 
(p>0.05).  
Concerning reaction times, we found a main effect of group F(1,58) = 9.449, p = 
.003, η2p = .140, showing that Portuguese had faster responses while classifying the 
offers made, when compared with Irish. However, the results were statistically non-
significant showing no main effect on offer type and offer type*group interaction (p>.05).  
Regarding the results for the classification on each proposer, who made the offers 
during the game, we did not find a main effect of group and of group*proposer type 
interaction (p<0.05). However, we found a main effect of proposer type (p = .001), 
revealing that, in both groups, the proposers associated with fair offers (Fair Faces) 
received a higher classification, following the by the ones who were offering mid offer 
(Mid Faces) and then the ones who made unfair offers (Unfair Faces), respectively (cf. 
Figure 3.3).  
 
 53 
 
Figure 3.3 – Average rates (%) for the two groups (Portuguese sample on the left and 
Irish one on the right on each of the two graphs) in the classification made for the offer 
type (on the left graph) and the proposer type (on the right graph), during 18 trials after 
playing the Ultimatum Game. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
Concerning reaction times, the results were statistically non-significant showing 
no main effect on group and proposer type*group interaction (p>.05). However, we found 
a main effect of proposer type, F(2,116) = 7.579, p = .001, η2p = .116, revealing that,  the 
Portuguese had faster responses while classifying the proposers who made the offers, 
when compared with the Irish group. 
Regarding the Proposer, we found a main effect on the offer type made between 
groups, F (1, 58) = 4.131, p = .047, in which the Irish group made higher offers to the 
opponent (cf. Figure 3.4). 
Concerning reaction times, we did not find a main effect of group, F(1, 58) = .187, 
p = .667..  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Average rates for the two groups (Portuguese sample on the left and Irish 
one on the right) during the Proposer. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
3.1.3. Centipede Game (CG) 
Regarding the decision-making results for the CG, we did not find a main effect 
of group, F(1, 58) = 1.00, p = .321, η2p = .017. However, we found a main effect of choice 
type, F(5, 290) = 48.96, p = .001, η2p = .458, ε= 0.352, revealing that, in both groups, 
Pass Mid (i.e., when the participant is passing the pot, while the opponents are being 
cooperative for half of the game and opportunistic during the other half) was significantly 
more chosen than Pass Coop (i.e., when the participant is passing the pot, while the 
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opponents are being cooperative ), Take Free (i.e., when the participant is taking the 
pot, while the opponents are being opportunistic), Pass Free (i.e., when the participant 
is passing the pot, while the opponents are being opportunistic), Take Coop (i.e., when 
the participant is taking the pot, while the opponents are being cooperative) and Take 
Mid (i.e., when the participant is taking the pot, while the opponents are being 
cooperative for half of the game and opportunistic during the other half). From the 
interaction between each choice type, p=.001, except for the ones between Pass Free 
and Take Coop (p=.054); Pass Coop and Take Free (p=.035) and finally, between Pass 
Free and Take Free (p= 1.000) (the last one is statistically non-significant). 
 We did not find a significant choice type*group interaction, F(5, 290) = 0.206, p 
= .960, η2p = .004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Average rates (%)  for the two groups (Portuguese sample on the left and 
Irish one on the right) during the Centipede Game. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals.  
Concerning reaction times, we did not find a main effect of group, F(1, 58) = 
1.533, p = .221, η2p = .026. We also did not find a main effect of choice type, F(2, 116) 
= 2.253, p = .110, η2p = .037, ε= 0.399 and of choice*group interaction, F(2, 116) = 0.962, 
p = .385, η2p = .016. 
3.1.4. Public Goods Game (PGG) 
Regarding the decision-making results for the PGG, we did not find a main effect 
of group, F(1, 58) = 0.900, p = .347, η2p = .016. However, we found a main effect of 
choice type, F(2, 89) = 46.34, p = .001, η2p = .448, ε= 0.311, revealing that, in both 
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groups, Success Coop (i.e., in which the participant is giving €5 to the public pot and 
the group is also contributing to it) > Failure Free (i.e., in which the participant is not 
contributing to the public pot and at least two members are not giving money to the group) 
> Success Free (i.e., in which the participant is not contributing to the group, while the 
opponents do so) > Failure Coop (i.e., in which the participant is giving €5 to the public 
pot and at least two members are not giving money to the group). From the interaction 
between each choice type, p=.001, except for the ones between Success Coop and 
Success Free; Success Coop and Failure Free; Success Free and Failure Free (p= 
1.000) were statistically non-significant (p=1.000). 
We did not find a significant choice type*group interaction, F(5, 285) = 0.658, p = 
.655, η2p = .011. 
Concerning reaction times, we did not find a main effect of group, F(1, 58) = 
2.361, p = .130, η2p = .039. We also did not find a main effect of choice type, F(3, 159) 
= 2.609, p = .112, η2p = .043, ε= 0.548 and of choice*group interaction, F(3, 159) = 1.748, 
p = .124, η2p = .029. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Average rates (%) for the two groups (the first graph corresponding to the 
cooperators and the left graph corresponding to the free-riders) during the Public Goods 
Game. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
3.1.5. Volunteer’s Dilemma (VD) 
Regarding the decision-making results for the VD, we did not find a main effect 
of group, F(1, 58) = 1.00, p = .321, η2p = .017. However, we found a main effect of choice 
type, F(1, 59) = 30.45, p = .001, η2p = .344, ε= 0.513, revealing that, in both groups, 
Passing (i.e., volunteering towards the group) was significantly more chosen than Taking 
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(i.e., keeping one euro for himself/herself) (p = .001). We did not find a significant choice 
type*group interaction, F(2, 116) = 0.589, p = .557, η2p = .010. 
Figure 3.7 – Average rates (%) for the two groups (Portuguese sample on the left and 
Irish one on the right) during the Volunteer’s Dilemma. Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
Concerning the results of the reaction times, we did not find a main effect of 
group, F(1, 59) = 3.328, p = .073, η2p = .054. However, we found a main effect of choice 
type, F(2, 116) = 3.759, p = .026, η2p = .061, ε= 0.941, revealing that Portuguese were 
faster in their responses, especially when they chose to free-ride. 
We did not find a significant choice type*group interaction, F(2, 116) = 0.254, p = 
.776, η2p = .004. 
3.2. EEG data 
3.2.1. Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) 
a) Results for the onset for the outcome: 
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Figure 3.8 – Onset for the outcome (upper image). Grand-averages of the FRN and 
P300 for the Irish (left) and Portuguese group (right) (bottom image). The FRN was 
measured at Fz, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time window of the 220-320ms. 
The P3 was measured at Pz, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time window of the 
350-450ms (bottom). Note: These results were presented on the poster board 
number F015 at FENS Forum this July 2018, in Berlin (cf. Appendix XIX). 
● At Fz, we found a main effect of group, F(1,55)=8.287, p=.006, η2p = .131, 
revealing that the FRN amplitude was more negative for Irish (M= -0.726, SD=0.160) 
than for the Portuguese group (M= -0.081, SD= 0.157). However, we did not find a 
significant main effect of feedback type, F(2,95)=1.630, p=.204, η2p = .029, nor group* 
feedback type interaction, F(2,95)=.388, p=. 683, η2p = .006. 
● At Pz, we found a main effect of group, F(1,55)=25.45, p<.001, η2p = .316, 
revealing that the P3 amplitude was larger for Portuguese (M=1.94, SD=0.337) than in 
the Irish group (M= -0.49, SD=0.343). However, we did not find a significant main effect 
of feedback type, F(2,110)=0.857, p=.427, η2p = .015, nor of group* feedback type 
interaction, F(2,110)= 1.636, p=.199, η2p = .029. 
b) Results for the onset for the computer’s choice: 
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Figure 3.9 – Onset for the computer’s choice (upper image). No ERP component was 
found for both the Irish and Portuguese group (bottom image). 
The results for this onset were inconclusive, as the data was very noisy and no 
ERP components was found (cf. Figure 3.9). This might have been due to the fact that 
participants did not anticipate the outcome at this stage and were expecting the slide 
with the final result instead (in order to know if they won/drew/lost), not paying too much 
attention to the computer’s choice slide. 
3.2.2. Ultimatum Game (UG)  
a) Results for the onset for the fake opponents’ picture: 
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Figure 3.10 – Onset for the fake opponent’s picture (upper image). Grand-averages of 
the N170 for the Irish (upper right) and Portuguese group (bottom right) (bottom image). 
The N170 was measured at P8, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time window of 
the 140-200ms for the Irish group and 120-180ms for the Portuguese group. 
 
● Regarding the first time window in P8 (i.e., between 140-200ms), we did not 
find a main effect of group, F(1,48)=.482, p=.491, η2p = .010. However, we observed that 
the N170 amplitude was more negative for Irish (Munfair=-0.9167, SDunfair=1.22536; Mfair=-
0.4538, SDfair=1.12780) than for the Portuguese group (Munfair=-0.5116, SDunfair=1.29295; 
Mfair=-0.3864, SDfair=1.45849). However, we did find a significant main effect of feedback 
type, F(1,48)=5.148, p=.028, η2p = .097, revealing that the fake opponents who made 
unfair offers had a more negative impact on the participants’ component amplitudes. 
We did not find a group* feedback type interaction, F(1,48)=1.697, p=. 199, η2p 
= .034. 
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● Regarding the second time window at P8 (i.e., between 120-180ms), we did 
not find a main effect of group, F(1,48)=0.990, p=.325, η2p = .020. However, we observed 
that the N170 amplitude was more negative for Portuguese (Munfair=-0.7696, 
SDunfair=1.26429; Mfair=-0.7395, SDfair=1.2880) than for the Irish group (Munfair=-0.5941, 
SDunfair=0.96481; Mfair=-0.3475, SDfair=0.87996). We did not find significant a main effect 
of feedback type, F(1,48)=0.987, p=.325, η2p = .020, nor group* feedback type 
interaction, F(1,48)=.603, p=. 441, η2p = .012. 
● For the latency, we found a main effect of group, F(1,49)=46.403, p=.001, η2p 
= .486, revealing that the N170 peak happened earlier for Portuguese for unfair offers 
(Munfair=134.94 SDunfair=22.23; Mfair=131.52, SDfair=21.21) than for the Irish group 
(Munfair=169.95, SDunfair=22.23; Mfair=161.42, SDfair=13.21). We also found a significant 
main effect of feedback type, F(1,49)=7.242, p=.010, η2p = .129. 
However, we did not find a group* feedback type interaction, F(1,49)=1.324, p=. 
255, η2p = .026. 
Since we found a main effect of feedback type, we decided to perform a paired t-
test, to see if there was a significant difference between the fair and unfair conditions in 
each group. Thus, we only found a main effect on the Irish group (p=0.014), while for the 
Portuguese group the difference was non-significant (p>0.05). 
Moreover, we decided to perform an independent t-test, in order to see if there 
were significant differences between the two feedback type. 
Therefore, we found that while the latency for unfair offers was significant 
(p=0.034), the one for fair offers was marginally significant (p=0.076). 
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Figure 3.11 – Latencies for the N170 in the two groups (1 for the Portuguese group and 
2 for the Irish ) for each feedback type (i.e., unfair and fair conditions). 
b) Results for the onset for the offer made by the fake opponent: 
Figure 3.12 – Onset for the offers made (upper image). Grand-averages of the MFN for 
the Irish (bottom left) and Portuguese group (bottom right). The MFN was measured at 
Fz, quantified as the mean amplitude in the time window of the 250-330ms for the Irish 
group and 200-280ms for the Portuguese group. 
 
● Regarding the first time window in Fz (i.e., between 250-330ms), we found a 
main effect of group, F(1,49)=31.290, p=.001, η2p = .390, revealing that the MFN 
amplitude was more negative for Irish (Munfair=-1.2779, SDunfair=0.91046; Mfair=-1.1785, 
SDfair=1.16931) than for the Portuguese group (Munfair=0.0430, SDunfair=0.67914; 
Mfair=0.0917, SDfair=0.69323). However, we did not find significant main effect of 
feedback type, F(1,49)=0.740, p=.394, η2p = .015, nor group* feedback type interaction, 
F(1,49)=.087, p=. 770, η2p = .002. 
● Regarding the second time window in Fz (i.e., between 200-280ms), we found 
a main effect of group, F(1,49)=17.625, p=.001, η2p = .265, revealing that the MFN 
amplitude was more negative for Portuguese (Munfair=-0.6941, SDunfair=0.57514; Mfair= -
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0.7593, SDfair=0.73319) than for the Irish group (Munfair= 0.2486, SDunfair= 0.90346; Mfair= 
0.449, SDfair=0.93724). However, we did not find significant main effect of feedback type, 
F(1,49)=2.596, p=.114, η2p = .050, nor group* feedback type interaction, F(1,49)=.736, 
p=. 395, η2p = .015. 
● For the latency, we found a main effect of group, F(1,49)=97.004, p=.001, η2p 
= .664, revealing that the MFN peak happened earlier for Portuguese for unfair offers 
(Munfair=231.71 SDunfair=29.90; Mfair=227.84, SDfair=29.20) than for the Irish group 
(Munfair=304.46, SDunfair=27.43; Mfair=302.26, SDfair=26.43). However, we did not find a 
significant main effect of feedback type, F(1,49)=1.308, p=.258, η2p = .026. 
We also did not find a group* feedback type interaction, F(1,49)=0.101, p=. 753, 
η2p = .002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 – Latencies for the MFN in the two groups (1 for the Portuguese group and 
2 for the Irish group) for each feedback type (i.e., unfair and fair conditions). 
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Chapter IV 
Discussion 
 
4.1. Behavioural data 
Our results for the Rock-Paper-Scissors matched our initial predictions, i.e.,  
no significant differences were observed between the two samples groups. This was an 
important achievement, as this game was initially introduced as the baseline game, i.e., 
to assess the balance between both of the samples (for example, the EEG equipment 
and the acquisition’s environments are as balanced as possible between Ireland and 
Portugal). We also found that regarding the choice type, Rock was the predominant 
choice when compared to the other two options, suggesting that Rock might be 
perceived as a stronger ‘winning-symbol’ when compared with paper and/or scissors. 
In the Ultimatum Game, no significant differences were found. Both groups 
tended to choose accepting fairer offers and rejecting unfair ones, in order to seek a 
higher score and punish the proposer who made unfair offers, respectively. This pattern 
has been present in previous behavioural studies that were also using  a population 
sample from an industrialized country, which in most cases were students (Hewig et al., 
2011; Henrich et al., 2001; Henrich et al.2006). When offers were below 20%, receivers 
would punish the unfair proposal with a cost from him/herself by rejecting the offer made. 
Moreover, in this present study, when it came to classify the proposals made, no 
differences were observed, as both groups gave a higher classification to the fair fake 
opponents than the unfair fake opponents. This suggests that participants were able to 
equally recognise the unfair fake opponents who behaved as free-riders during the 
game, by giving them a lower classification when compared to the fair fake opponents. 
However, the Portuguese sample showed faster responses in classifying the offers made 
and also the proposers who made such offers, when compared to the Irish sample, which 
can suggest that Portuguese participants were more likely to make impulsive decisions. 
Nevertheless, when the roles were inverted (i.e., participant would play as a proposer, 
instead of a receiver), Portuguese people tended to withhold the offers, so they could 
keep more money for themselves, while Irish tended to be more generous in their offers. 
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Interestingly, within both the Centipede Game and Public Goods Game, 
participants tended to be more cooperative, when surrounded by a single / group of fake 
opponents, respectively, avoiding misbehaviour in front of their fake opponents and risk 
being considered a free-rider. However, once a few fake opponents switched their 
behaviour, participants tended to readjust their strategy by starting to take advantage of 
others, in this case, by taking the majority of the profits for themselves (i.e., instead of 
contributing with money, they would withhold it for their own benefit). We also observed 
that cooperators in the Public Goods Game changed their strategy after a failure and a 
success. Where participants failed, they would switch to a safer strategy and avoid taking 
risks by investing money into the shared pot, whereas after a success they tended to 
play randomly and in some cases take more risk, by investing their money into the group.  
On the other hand, free-riders did not change their behaviour independently of a 
success or failure scenario, showing no significant behavioural differences between the 
two countries. This finding is in accordance to Chung and colleagues (2015), revealing 
that the CondS (also known as, the Standard Condition) is ideal to study free-riders, 
since this condition offers an equal amount of money regardless of the choices made by 
each individual if the group succeeds, thus making it “easier” to take risks by not investing 
into the group and acting as a free-rider. 
Regarding the Volunteer’s Dilemma, both groups chose to cooperate towards the 
group rather than choosing to take risks, by not investing their money and consequently, 
ended up losing their money, if no one volunteered. This result was not found in our initial 
predictions, i.e., according to Goeree and colleagues (2017), the chances of having no 
volunteers in a larger group is very high, since the expectation of at least one-person 
volunteering towards the group is equally as high. This suggest that when a sample is 
composed of younger-adults (in this present study, we used majoritarily students), the 
tendency of taking higher risk decreases. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate 
if this pattern persists in future studies, using different age groups, as performed by 
Fernandes et. al (2018). 
Our findings also match the previous ones made by Lopes (2014), i.e., even 
though Portuguese people saw free-riding as misconduct, whenever they had the chance 
to pay to punish, they avoided to enter with costs that would punish free-riders, unlike 
the Finnish, proving that social norms and social sanctions might be differently perceived 
across cultures, thus proving that Game Theory is a useful tool to study (dis)similarities 
between cultures.  
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Alongside this, Lopes (2014) also observed that the Finnish tended to trust and 
take more risk-based decisions, by investing more money than the Portuguese sample. 
Portuguese were also more prone to compete than Finnish. The same was observed 
between the Portuguese and Irish samples. 
Our study suggests that the Portuguese sample’s economic strategies are 
intrinsically related to the cultural influences, since they seem to have a similar pattern 
of behaviour when competing against other cultures. It would be interesting to compare 
both Finnish and Irish people and then combine all three cultures in a separate study, so 
we could unravel and establish which strategies are used by each culture, in order to 
increase their own profits, respectively. 
This behaviour might also be explained by the current economic situation and the 
value of money in each country. For instance, in terms of salary income, Portuguese 
people need to work twice as much in order to obtain the minimal wage of Ireland and 
four times as much, in order to reach the level of the Finnish lifestyle. So, it might be 
easier for an Irish or Finnish person to invest their money to punish misconducts, while 
Portuguese people might prefer to save the money for themselves. Besides, the samples 
used in this study represent a newer generation that are known as “low-investors”, which 
can also be explained by the lack of significance in some of the results obtained. 
4.2. EEG data 
Each trial of the Rock-Paper-Scissors comprised a decision stage followed by a 
feedback stage, during which the outcome was shown. Subjects could win, lose or draw. 
We examined two feedback-locked event-related potentials (ERPs) that play a crucial 
role in the feedback processing: the Feedback Related Negativity (FRN) and the P3 
(Miltner et al., 1997; Martín, 2012; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Donchin and Coles, 1988; 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011). The FRN is generated in the anterior cingulate cortex and, 
according to the reward prediction error hypothesis (Miltner et al., 1997), it  is  
consistently  larger  for  negative  than  for  positive feedbacks (Martín, 2012). According 
to the reinforcement-learning  theory,  this  increased  amplitude elicited by negative 
outcomes results from a decreasing in the dopaminergic activity after events that are 
worse than expected, which allows the adaptation of the motor system control according 
to the feedback  contingencies (Holroyd and Coles, 2002). The P3 has widespread 
sources  and, according to the context-updating hypothesis (Donchin and Coles, 1988), 
it indexes the brain activity underlying the revision  of  a  mental  model  of  a  task  
induced  by  a  stimulus.  If a  stimulus  delivers information  that  is  inconsistent  with  
 66 
 
the  mental  model,  it  will  be  updated  and  the  P3 amplitude will be proportional to 
the amount of cognitive resources employed during the updating. Outcomes associated 
with higher levels of arousal or task-relevance elicit larger P3 amplitudes, reflecting 
increased allocation of attention (Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Thus, while the FRN appears to 
be sensitive to expectancy violations, the P3 appears to be sensitive to the arousing 
nature of the feedback. 
Our results for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game showed that groups significantly 
differed in amplitude of both FRN and P3, revelling that culture may significantly influence 
the processing of feedback.  
Interestingly, we did not find a main effect of condition, since gains, losses and 
draws elicited similar amplitudes for both FRN and P3. Considering the functional 
significance of both components, this result may be explained by the fact that participants 
played a luck-based game, in which the expectations and the arousing level of each 
result were similar. However, this result did not meet our initial prediction, since this game 
was introduced as the baseline game, in order to establish an equilibrium between the 
two sites. Therefore, it can be speculated that the cultural settings may play a crucial role 
in the way feedback is processed. 
Regarding the N170 in the Ultimatum Game, we found that the Portuguese 
sample had the component happening earlier for both conditions (faster for fair than 
unfair conditions). The N170 latency happened earlier in the right hemisphere, which is 
in accordance with previous findings (Blau et al., 2007). 
Interestingly, we found that the difference of the feedback type (i.e., unfair/fair) 
was significant, revealing that the fake opponents who made unfair offers had a more 
negative impact on the participants of the study. 
This suggests that the N170 is a crucial ERP component for face processing 
(Blau et al., 2007; Ghuman et al., 2014; Kropotov, 2016) and that it is sensitive to the 
faces of the fake opponents who might have played a negative role throughout the game 
(i.e., participants learned to recognize the faces that were associated with free-riders 
versus cooperators). 
The MFN amplitude differed between groups, which is not in accordance with the 
lack of differences found in fairness ratings. This evidence suggests that the Irish group 
would have a higher unfairness sensibility, indexed by a higher MFN amplitude. 
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However, the correlation between the MFN amplitude and the difference between 
fairness ratings given to unfair and fair offers were non-significant. This lack of correlation 
leads us to hypothesize that MFN component can be modulated by the magnitude of the 
stakes (which were higher in unfair than in fair conditions), rather than by the unfairness 
of the offers. Regarding the latency, we also found that the MFN for the Portuguese 
group happened earlier. 
Moreover, according to our results, the behavioral differences found between 
groups may underlie different economic preferences, rather than unfairness sensitivity. 
Also, the lack of empathy in our paradigm may also influence the decision-making 
in social contexts. 
Future studies and alternative interpretations must be considered to confirm 
whether this pattern of neural responses to unfairness is similar or not.   
4.3. Project limitations 
There are several limitations associated to this research study. For instance, even 
though the EEG technique has a high temporal resolution (in milliseconds), its spatial 
resolution is quite low, which means that the recorded signal may include a high number 
of individualities that will have to be taken into account during the interpretation of the 
activated regions of the brain during each of the games. 
Second of all, there is another limitation associated with the design of the games, 
which is they are commonly played in one shot, i.e., only one time, in order to avoid the 
participants to learn what the best strategy is and then change their behaviours 
accordingly. Thus, it becomes very challenging to create paradigms that fit the features 
of the EEG, since, to obtain a good signal, we need to have several trials of the same 
conditions/stimuli (approximately 30 trials). 
Thirdly, the fact that it is a cultural study. Therefore, even though creating the 
same conditions of study across countries is crucial, it can be very difficult to get. For 
example, the setup of the recording rooms was different (i.e., DCU had an electrical 
shielded room for participants that was separated from the recording room, while in 
Porto, the recording room was only separated by a see-through glass from the space 
where the participants were). Besides, even though we used a 32-channel EEG, the 
layout of the caps was not equivalent in four different electrodes. However, all of this was 
taken into consideration and solved, so that during our analysis, we could discard 
external factors as the origin of the differences observed. 
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Finally, another important limitation of this research study was that our samples 
were not representative enough of the Portuguese and Irish cultures, i.e., it would have 
been interesting to have a sample with different ages and backgrounds (e.g. the study 
conducted by Fernandes et. al., 2018, where they examined age-related differences in 
behavioural responses to risk in neural correlates of feedback processing). 
4.4. Future research 
This research study was inspired by Lopes et al, 2014 and a lot of their 
suggestions for future improvement were taken into account for this study, such as 
bringing some reality to the context of the games participants were playing (e.g., taking 
a picture of each participant at the beginning of each session) and using a neuroimaging 
technique to obtain new measures that would help creating new constructs and theories 
that could then be used to predict economic-based behaviours. 
 Regarding future studies, it would be interesting and potentially significant for 
social studies, to combine other neuroimaging techniques (e.g., fMRI) and see how 
freeriders can emotionally affect decision-making processes. Besides, it would be easier 
to create paradigms for this purpose, as they would be played in only one shot.  
 Another suggestion would be to use more than one participant during the same 
session, in order to create a real interaction with participants. That could be achieved by 
generating a setting that would lodge more than one EEG at the same time. 
 Finally, it is important to replicate cultural studies using similar cultures, in order 
to eradicate the idea that the differences observed are due to genetical factors. 
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Appendixes 
I- List of games from Game Theory 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_games_in_game_theory , accessed the first time on the 8th January 2017) 
 
 
 
Game 
 
Number 
of 
Players 
 
Strategies 
per player 
Number of  
Nash 
equilibrium 
 
Sequential 
game 
 
Perfect 
information 
 
Zero 
sum 
 
Notes 
Battle of the 
sexes  
2 2 2 No No No It is similar to the Coordination game 
Blotto games  2 variable variable No No Yes This type of game is normally used as a metaphor for 
electoral competition or in auction theory 
 
Cake cutting  N, 
usually 
2 
infinite variable Yes Yes Yes It is used to study fair offers 
Centipede 
game  
2 variable 1 Yes Yes No Like the Prisoner’s dilemma, this game represents a conflict 
between self-interest and mutual benefit 
Chicken (aka 
hawk-dove) 
2 2 2 No No No This game is commonly called as an ‘anti-coordination game’, 
in which it is mutually beneficial for the players to play 
different strategies 
Coordination 
game  
N variable >2 No No No It is used in social sciences and economics to study 
competition and cooperation 
Cournot game  2 infinite 1 No No No It is normally used to study an industry structure in which 
companies compete on the amount of output they will 
produce 
Deadlock  2 2 1 No No No The best decision is dominant and beneficial and 
there are no conflicts between players to achieve a better 
strategy 
  
 
Dictator game  2 infinite 1 N/A N/A Yes This type of game is normally used to study altruistic 
behaviour 
Diner's 
dilemma  
N 2 1 No No No Similar to Prisoner’s dilemma, however instead of two 
players, there is N players 
Dollar auction  2 2 0 Yes Yes No Players in this game are compelled to make irrational choices 
based on a set of apparently rational choices 
El Farol bar  N 2 variable No No No N players with two different strategies chosen at the same 
time 
Game without 
a value  
2 infinite 0 No No Yes Both players play a perfect strategy (that is, knowing each 
other’s objectives) 
Guess 2/3 of 
the average  
N infinite 1 No No Maybe* This type of game illustrates the difference between perfect 
rationality and the common knowledge of that rationality 
Kuhn poker  2 27 & 64 0 Yes No Yes Simpler version of a poker game that uses three cards (King, 
Queen and Jack) 
Matching 
pennies  
2 2 0 No No Yes This is a “random” game based on winning or losing the 
guess 
Minority game  N 2 variable No No No This game is a variant of the El Farol bar game, in which the 
players who stay on the minority side, win the game 
Nash 
bargaining 
game  
2 infinite infinite No No No It is used to study the effects of risk aversion 
Peace War 
game  
N variable >2 Yes No No This game was invented to study cooperation and aggression 
Pirate game  N infinite infinite Yes Yes No This game is a version of the Ultimatum game 
Princess and 
monster game  
2 infinite 0 No No Yes This game is an example of a pursuit-evasion game 
Prisoner's 
dilemma  
2 2 1 No No No This game is used as a model for social cooperation 
Public goods  N infinite 1 No No No It is similar to the Prisoner’s dilemma and is used to study 
prosociality 
Rock, paper, 
scissors  
2 3 0 No No Yes “Random” game in which it is impossible to gain an 
advantage 
Screening 
game  
N variable variable Yes No No This is a game where complete honesty is not optimal for one 
of the players, leading to several strategies by the exchange 
of ideas 
  
 
Signaling 
game  
N variable variable Yes No No This game describes situations in which only one of the 
players knows about a secret information, while the other one 
does not 
Stag hunt  2 2 2 No No No It is used to describe a conflict between safety and social 
cooperation 
Traveler's 
dilemma  
2 N >> 1 1 No No No The players try to maximize their own profit, without 
considering the other player’s payoff 
Truel 3 1-3 infinite Yes Yes No “Duel” of three participants, in which they fight for survival 
Trust game 2 infinite 1 Yes Yes No This is game is very similar to the Dictator game and it is 
used to study trust and trustworthiness 
Ultimatum 
game  
2 infinite infinite Yes Yes No It is very similar to the Dictator game and used to study 
fairness 
Volunteer's 
dilemma  
N 2 2 No No No N players must decide whether to make a “small sacrifice”, in 
which all will gain from it, whether to freeride 
War of 
attrition  
2 2 0 No No No This is a win or loss game (attack/defence) 
 
*If the payoff is split between players that make an optimal guess, then it is Sum-zero. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
II- Ethical Approval from Ireland  
 
  
  
 
III- Ethical Approval from Portugal 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
IV- Handedness Questionnaire (English version) 
EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS INVENTORY 
(retrieved from http://www.brainmapping.org/shared/Edinburgh.php) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
V- Handedness Questionnaire (Portuguese version) 
EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS INVENTORY 
(retrieved from http://www.brainmapping.org/shared/Edinburgh.php) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
VI- IC- Informed Consent (English version) 
 
 
 
  
 
VII- IC- Informed Consent (Portuguese version) 
 
 
 
  
 
VIII- IPEAS – Irish-Portuguese Enculturation / Acculturation Survey 
(English version) 
 
 
  
 
IX- IPEAS – Irish-Portuguese Enculturation / Acculturation Survey 
(Portuguese version) 
 
  
 
X- PLS – Plain Language Statement (Irish version) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
XI- PLS – Plain Language Statement (Portuguese version) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
XII- Games instructions (English version) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
XIII- Games instructions (Portuguese version) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
XIV- Games order 
Participant 
1 
Participant 
2 
Participant 
3 
Participant 
4 
Participant 
5 
Participant 
6 
RPS 
UG 
CG 
PGG 
VD 
 
RPS 
UG 
CG 
VD 
PGG 
 
RPS 
UG 
PGG 
CG 
VD 
 
RPS 
UG 
PGG 
VD 
CG 
 
RPS 
UG 
VD 
PGG 
CG 
 
RPS 
UG 
VD 
CG 
PGG 
 
Participant 
7 
Participant 
8 
Participant 
9 
Participant 
10 
Participant 
11 
Participant 
12 
RPS 
CG 
UG 
PGG 
VD 
 
RPS 
CG 
UG 
VD 
PGG 
 
RPS 
CG 
PGG 
UG 
VD 
 
RPS 
CG 
PGG 
VD 
UG 
 
RPS 
CG 
VD 
PGG 
UG 
 
RPS 
CG 
VD 
UG 
PGG 
 
Participant 
13 
Participant 
14 
Participant 
15 
Participant 
16 
Participant 
17 
Participant 
18 
RPS 
PGG 
UG 
CG 
VD 
 
RPS 
PGG 
UG 
VD 
CG 
 
RPS 
PGG 
CG 
UG 
VD 
 
RPS 
PGG 
CG 
VD 
UG 
 
RPS 
PGG 
VD 
CG 
UG 
 
RPS 
PGG 
VD 
UG 
CG 
 
Participant 
19 
Participant 
20 
Participant 
21 
Participant 
22 
Participant 
23 
Participant 
24 
RPS 
VD 
UG 
CG 
PGG 
 
RPS 
VD 
UG 
PGG 
CG 
 
RPS 
VD 
CG 
UG 
PGG 
 
RPS 
VD 
CG 
PGG 
UG 
 
RPS 
VD 
PGG 
CG 
UG 
 
RPS 
VD 
PGG 
UG 
CG 
 
Participant 
25 
Participant 
26 
Participant 
27 
Participant 
28 
Participant 
29 
Participant 
30 
RPS 
UG 
CG 
PGG 
VD 
 
RPS 
UG 
CG 
VD 
PGG 
 
RPS 
UG 
PGG 
CG 
VD 
 
RPS 
UG 
PGG 
VD 
CG 
 
RPS 
UG 
VD 
PGG 
CG 
 
RPS 
UG 
VD 
CG 
PGG 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
XV- Triggers  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
XVI- Final results and scores of each participant 
 
Portuguese 
Participant 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Profession 
 
MoCA score 
 
Handedness 
results (%) 
 
IPEAS 
results 
 
EEG cap 
reference 
(ANT system) 
 
Notes 
 
Final score 
of the five 
games 
 
 
1 
 
 
M 
 
 
22 
 
 
Student 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
 
He spent one 
week abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
1050,91 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
F 
 
 
35 
 
 
Student 
 
 
27,5 
 
 
100 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions)  
1/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
She wears 
glasses 
 
She travelled 
on holidays 
for three 
months 
 
 
746,35 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
M 
 
 
44 
 
 
Manager 
  
 
 26 
 
 
90 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
 
He spent one 
month 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
725,41 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
F 
 
 
45 
 
 
Clinical 
Analysis 
Technician 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
1/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
 
211092 
 
She wears 
glasses 
 
She spent 
three months 
away with 
her parents 
as a baby 
(she was 
 
 
690,78 
 
  
 
 
 
 
less than 1-
year old) 
 
 
5  
 
 
F 
 
 
31 
 
 
Clients 
assistant 
 
 
28 
 
 
80 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
 
211093 
 
 
She has 
never left the 
country 
 
 
1009,53 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
F 
 
 
44 
 
 
Call centre 
 
 
26 
 
 
100 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
She spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
898,61 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
M 
 
 
22 
 
 
Student 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
2/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
He wears 
glasses 
 
He spent one 
week and a 
half abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
 
769,9 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
M 
 
 
19 
 
 
Student 
 
 
27 
 
 
80 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
He spent 
three weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
722,46 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
F 
 
 
24 
 
 
Student 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
She spent 
four months 
abroad 
(ERASMUS) 
 
 
697,49 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
10 
 
 
M 
 
 
22 
 
 
Student 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
 
He spent two 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
861,82 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
M 
 
 
18 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
1/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
 
He spent two 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
857,68 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
Student 
 
 
30 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
1/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
 
He spent one 
week abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
728,64 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
F 
 
 
25 
 
 
Student 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
She spent 
one month 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
931,64 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
F 
 
 
22 
 
 
Student 
 
 
30 
 
 
100 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
 
She spent 
ten days 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
933,6 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
M 
 
 
20 
 
 
Student 
 
  
 29 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
He spent two 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
958,69 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
M 
 
 
27 
 
 
Security 
Assistant 
 
 
26,5 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
He spent one 
week abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
817,64 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
M 
 
 
27 
 
 
Shopkeeper 
 
 
26 
 
 
90 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
He spent two 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
991,55 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
M 
 
 
30 
 
 
Researcher 
 
 
28 
 
 
100 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
He spent two 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
908,8 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
M 
 
 
19 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
He spent one 
week abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
952,62 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
F 
 
 
25 
 
 
Psychologist 
 
 
26 
 
 
100 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
She spent six 
months 
abroad  
(ERASMUS)  
 
 
1034,9 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
F 
 
 
23 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
90 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
1/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
She spent 
one month 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
986,36 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
F 
 
 
23 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
90 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
She spent 
five days 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
953,74 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
M 
 
 
19 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
100 
10/10 (for 
the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
He spent one 
week abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
842,73 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
M 
 
 
21 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
 
He spent a 
few hours in 
Spain 
 
 
1047,79 
 
 
25 
 
M 
 
18 
 
Student 
 
26 
 
100 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
211091 
 
He spent one 
week abroad 
(holidays) 
 
1018,88 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
F 
 
 
31 
 
 
Researcher 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
She spent 
three months 
abroad 
(ERASMUS) 
 
 
785,78 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
F 
 
 
25 
 
 
Event 
hostess 
 
 
28 
 
 
65 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
2/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211091 
 
She spent 
three weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
951,97 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
F 
 
 
23 
 
 
Student 
 
 
29 
 
 
100 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
2/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
She spent 
five months 
abroad 
(ERAMUS) 
 
 
892,55 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
F 
 
 
23 
 
 
Psychologist  
 
 
28,5 
 
 
90 
9/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211093 
 
She spent 
three months 
abroad 
(ERASMUS) 
 
 
790,79 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
F 
 
 
18 
 
 
Student 
 
 
27 
 
 
100 
8/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
0/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
211092 
 
 
She spent 
three days 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
833,66 
 
 
 
Irish 
Participants 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Profession 
 
MoCA score 
 
Handedness 
results (%) 
 
IPEAS 
results 
 
EEG cap 
reference 
(BioSemi) (*) 
 
Notes 
 
Final score 
of the five 
games 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 M 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
Lecturer in 
DCU 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
2/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He wears 
glasses 
 
He spent four 
months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
810,61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
Lecturer in 
DCU 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
2/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He wears 
glasses 
 
He spent two 
months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
806,76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
 
 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
He wears 
glasses 
 
He spent two 
months 
abroad (PhD 
program) 
849,39 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
M 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
Chaplain 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
 
Large 
 
 
 
 
 
He spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
878,59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
M 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
 
He spent 
three weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
936,96 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
M 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
Post-doc 
researcher 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
He spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
760,55 
 
 
 
 
 
37  
F 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
Worker in the 
Science 
Gallery 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two years in 
England as a 
baby 
1028,52 
 
 
 
38 
F 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
814,69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
F 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
949,61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
F 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
7/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
786,49 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
 
He spent one 
month 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
841,69 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
M 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
Researcher 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
3/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
 
 
He spent ten 
months 
abroad 
(training 
course) 
1397,94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
F 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
960,74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 F 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
 
 
She spent six 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
880,44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
F 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
742,6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
F 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
944,35 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
47 
F 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
884,79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
F 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
three weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
847,79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
F 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
916,62 
 
 
 
 
50 
F 
 
 
21 
 
 
Student 
 
 
25 
 
 
80 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
10/10 (for 
the Irish 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
947,53 
 
 
 
 
51 
F 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Medium/small 
 
 
 
 
She spent six 
weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
874,61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
F 
 
 
22 
 
 
Student 
 
 
28 
 
 
100 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
Medium/small 
 
 
She spent 
three months 
946,48 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
 
 
53 
M 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
PhD student 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
He spent 
nine months 
abroad 
(training 
course) 
 
833,43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
M 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
He spent one 
month 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
898,36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
M 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
 
 
He spent one 
month 
abroad 
 
 
834,89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 F 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
9/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
 
 
953,91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
M 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large 
 
 
 
 
He spent one 
year abroad 
(ERASMUS) 
 
796,81 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
M 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
7/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
He spent 
three months 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
671,69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
0/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
She spent 
one month 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
623,57 
 
 
 
60 
F 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
7/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
Large/medium 
 
 
 
 
She spent 
two weeks 
abroad 
(holidays) 
 
975,83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portuguese participants that were dismissed  
 
  
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Profession 
 
MoCA 
score 
 
Handedness 
results (%) 
 
IPEAS 
results 
 
EEG cap 
reference 
(ANT system) 
 
Notes 
 
Justification 
for dismissal 
 F 24 Unemployed 23 - - - MoCA <26 Inclusion 
criteria were 
not fulfilled. In 
this case, the 
MoCA final 
result was 
<26. 
 F 27 Student 24 90 - - MoCA <26 Inclusion 
criteria were 
  
 
 
 
 
not fulfilled. In 
this case, the 
MoCA final 
result was 
<26. 
 M 21 Student 25 100 - - MoCA <26 Inclusion 
criteria were 
not fulfilled. In 
this case, the 
MoCA final 
result was 
<26. 
 M 21 Student 25 100 - - MoCA <26 Inclusion 
criteria were 
not fulfilled. In 
this case, the 
MoCA final 
result was 
<26. 
 F 23 Student 23 100 - - MoCA <26 Inclusion 
criteria were 
not fulfilled. In 
this case, the 
MoCA final 
result was 
<26. 
 
Irish participants that were dismissed  
 
  
Gender 
 
Age 
 
Profession 
 
MoCA 
score 
 
Handedness 
results (%) 
 
IPEAS 
results 
 
EEG cap 
reference 
(BioSemi) (*) 
 
 
 
Justification for dismissal 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
Student 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
100 
1/10 (for the 
Portuguese 
questions) 
8/10 (for the 
Irish 
questions) 
 
 
 
Medium/Small 
The participant did not fulfil all 
the criteria of inclusion. In this 
case, the participant suffered 
from epilepsy and persisted 
towards participation in the 
study, even though she was 
informed of her ineligibility.  
(*) Head circumference electro-cap International, Inc. Eaton, Ohio 45320 USA (Biosemi): 
Large Size (blue cap): 58-62 cm 
Large / medium (purple and red cap): 56-60 cm 
Medium / small (yellow and red cap): 52-56 cm 
 
  
 
 
 
 
XVII- Behavioural Results (%) and Reaction Times (in milliseconds) of the Portuguese and Irish Participants 
 
1) Rock-Paper-Scissors (this game had total of 90 trials). Portuguese (from 1-30) and Irish (from 31-60) participants behavioural results (%) 
and Reaction Times (RT) (in milliseconds) 
 
PARTICIPANT ROCK 
(%) 
RT (*) PAPER 
(%) 
RT (*) SCISSORS 
(%) 
RT (*) WIN 
(%) 
DRAW 
(%) 
LOSE 
(%) 
1 41,11 399,00 35,56 379,50 23,33 380,10 47,78 33,33 18,89 
2 40,00 1592,00 30,00 1170,00 30,00 1386,90 31,11 34,44 34,44 
3 26,67 1958,00 30,00 1684,00 43,33 1783,10 37,78 27,78 34,44 
4 32,22 1009,00 33,33 904,60 34,44 950,48 41,11 36,67 22,22 
5 40,00 1026,00 18,89 958,00 41,11 1304,70 27,78 38,89 33,33 
6 37,78 932,00 22,22 723,70 40,00 625,36 32,22 34,44 33,33 
7 42,22 1069,00 26,67 672,60 31,11 1307,50 35,56 31,11 33,33 
8 46,67 667,00 26,67 2156,00 26,67 1886,00 43,33 40,00 16,67 
9 34,44 1755,00 26,67 1260,00 38,89 1655,10 31,11 38,89 30,00 
10 34,44 810,00 31,11 426,90 34,44 441,29 21,11 34,44 44,44 
11 31,11 1899,00 30,00 2157,00 38,89 2144,40 33,33 24,44 42,22 
12 38,89 1009,00 28,89 752,70 32,22 782,34 41,11 24,44 34,44 
13 33,33 788,00 34,44 716,50 32,22 745,55 41,11 33,33 25,56 
14 34,44 969,00 31,11 1052,00 34,44 825,40 28,89 35,56 35,56 
15 41,11 1421,00 31,11 932,90 27,78 1352,20 46,67 26,67 26,67 
16 57,78 871,00 23,33 807,80 18,89 1009,20 33,33 31,11 35,56 
17 35,56 648,00 28,89 720,20 35,56 478,59 47,78 31,11 21,11 
  
 
 
 
 
18 33,33 3321,00 41,11 3375,00 25,56 3896,50 43,33 25,56 31,11 
19 33,33 722,00 31,11 741,60 35,56 868,56 38,89 31,11 30,00 
20 37,78 882,00 30,00 894,90 32,22 601,83 37,78 25,56 36,67 
21 36,67 4469,00 44,44 3810,00 18,89 785,76 43,33 22,22 34,44 
22 34,44 1342,00 34,44 1628,00 31,11 1623,00 55,56 25,56 18,89 
23 28,89 1957,00 36,67 1439,00 34,44 1739,40 43,33 28,89 27,78 
24 35,56 3125,00 32,22 3590,00 32,22 3242,70 54,44 31,11 14,44 
25 35,56 2110,00 33,33 1825,00 31,11 1806,10 61,11 20,00 18,89 
26 27,78 572,00 34,44 428,80 37,78 552,97 26,67 33,33 40,00 
27 70,00 745,00 21,11 538,70 8,89 237,25 34,44 26,67 38,89 
28 31,11 801,00 34,44 881,20 34,44 898,26 31,11 37,78 31,11 
29 33,33 893,00 30,00 488,40 36,67 649,45 37,78 34,44 27,78 
30 31,11 1190,00 33,33 914,20 35,56 1604,90 41,11 35,56 23,33 
31 30,00 2228,70 38,89 1434,00 31,11 1451,90 31,11 35,56 33,33 
32 35,56 1378,70 30,00 1520,00 34,44 923,42 33,33 32,22 34,44 
33 68,89 590,31 17,78 968,80 13,33 802,00 36,67 34,44 28,89 
34 35,56 1520,60 31,11 1661,00 33,33 1354,40 43,33 31,11 25,56 
35 36,67 1724,30 30,00 2011,00 33,33 2332,80 50,00 26,67 23,33 
36 31,11 444,36 21,11 472,60 47,78 619,60 33,33 30,00 36,67 
37 34,44 456,39 32,22 406,70 33,33 401,40 50,00 32,22 17,78 
38 35,56 2279,00 33,33 2031,00 31,11 1944,70 33,33 32,22 34,44 
39 37,78 412,44 32,22 518,70 30,00 487,04 26,67 28,89 44,44 
40 41,11 484,65 27,78 440,20 31,11 395,70 37,78 28,89 33,33 
41 35,56 1763,90 34,44 2035,00 30,00 1299,20 31,11 38,89 30,00 
  
 
 
 
 
42 35,56 547,38 31,11 553,30 33,33 625,80 42,22 33,33 24,44 
43 34,44 539,61 37,78 675,70 27,78 673,00 28,89 35,56 35,56 
44 38,89 596,51 32,22 563,10 28,89 859,46 36,67 36,67 26,67 
45 30,00 2259,10 34,44 1532,00 35,56 2013,50 46,67 28,89 24,44 
46 35,56 305,25 37,78 330,30 26,67 360,42 44,44 25,56 30,00 
47 36,67 1121,70 28,89 878,00 34,44 1057,10 34,44 22,22 43,33 
48 33,33 645,00 34,44 759,30 32,22 661,58 37,78 26,67 35,56 
49 37,78 445,73 31,11 578,30 31,11 445,86 22,22 25,56 52,22 
50 27,78 792,64 35,56 949,70 36,67 762,09 37,78 33,33 28,89 
51 35,56 2039,20 36,67 1987,00 27,78 1254,40 36,67 38,89 24,44 
52 28,89 1126,40 42,22 1398,00 28,89 1748,50 36,67 26,67 36,67 
53 37,78 703,22 25,56 909,40 33,33 706,47 32,22 27,78 40,00 
54 31,11 2173,40 35,56 2451,00 33,33 1970,20 37,78 33,33 28,89 
55 30,00 2363,60 37,78 1793,00 32,22 1810,40 45,56 31,11 23,33 
56 32,22 590,03 27,78 614,30 40,00 466,92 32,22 30,00 37,78 
57 34,44 560,00 38,89 415,30 26,67 333,00 33,33 32,22 34,44 
58 41,11 688,51 34,44 750,40 24,44 566,95 30,00 40,00 30,00 
59 36,67 1471,70 31,11 1425,00 32,22 1182,90 48,89 37,78 13,33 
60 32,22 1253,00 33,33 1328,00 34,44 1410,30 37,78 23,33 38,89 
*Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds) 
Notes: 
ROCK represents the number of times the participant chose the option 1 on the computer screen. 
PAPER represents the number of times the participant chose the option 2 on the computer screen. 
  
 
 
 
 
SCISSORS represent the number of times the participant chose the option 3 on the computer screen. 
WIN represents the number of times the participant won against the computer. 
DRAW represents the number of times the participant drawn against the computer. 
LOSE represents the number of times the participant lost against the computer. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
2) Ultimatum Game (this game had total of 120 trials). Portuguese (from 1-30) and Irish (from 31-60) participants behavioural results (%) and 
Reaction Times (RT) (in milliseconds) 
 
PARTICIPANT FAIR 
ACCEPT 
(%) 
RT (*) MID 
ACCEPT 
(%) 
RT (*) UNFAIR 
ACCEPT 
(%) 
RT (*) FAIR 
REJECT 
(%) 
RT (*) MID 
REJECT 
(%) 
RT (*) UNFAIR 
REJECT 
(%) 
RT (*) 
1 35,00 354,91 3,33 629,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 30,83 333,70 30,83 355,79 
2 28,33 848,00 13,33 993,30 ,83 4122,00 ,00 ,00 20,83 1004,13 36,67 1033,87 
3 27,50 1903,60 2,50 2184,00 8,33 1318,00 7,50 1837,40 30,83 1274,00 23,33 1024,90 
4 30,00 1224,50 20,00 1085,17 18,33 1189,63 ,00 ,00 1,67 876,00 19,17 2038,60 
5 15,83 1358,26 30,00 896,67 20,83 1062,00 15,00 1277,94 5,00 2070,67 13,33 828,81 
6 30,00 586,47 37,50 686,07 6,67 895,10 ,00 ,00 4,17 890,00 21,67 694,50 
7 15,83 1072,60 24,17 919,00 3,33 1806,00 17,50 684,81 6,67 1026,00 32,50 546,82 
8 27,50 419,58 18,33 422,00 ,83 4213,00 7,50 373,00 14,17 450,06 31,67 359,95 
9 14,17 717,65 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 21,67 791,23 29,17 638,00 35,00 557,76 
10 27,50 606,73 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,83 4300,00 34,17 1047,00 37,50 1088,30 
11 27,50 498,18 1,67 563,00 ,00 ,00 3,33 419,50 30,00 685,50 37,50 687,38 
12 30,00 618,00 20,83 710,50 ,83 574,00 1,67 2265,00 12,50 479,00 34,17 430,00 
13 31,67 620,26 31,67 836,32 ,83 601,00 1,67 715,00 1,67 1924,50 32,50 641,33 
14 20,83 912,08 19,17 1238,00 15,00 1287,00 12,50 576,40 8,33 868,50 24,17 795,21 
15 35,83 545,72 25,00 1035,07 ,83 984,00 ,00 ,00 9,17 632,40 29,17 540,00 
16 32,50 1157,89 34,17 821,95 33,33 1181,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
17 28,33 493,00 30,83 461,86 23,33 715,39 ,83 1266,00 ,83 544,00 15,83 353,16 
18 32,50 868,93 31,67 718,47 30,83 609,50 1,67 838,50 1,67 343,50 1,67 859,00 
19 35,00 446,67 27,50 518,52 11,67 747,93 ,00 ,00 ,83 592,00 25,00 750,30 
20 30,00 355,33 22,50 528,00 2,50 906,70 ,00 ,00 20,83 763,80 24,17 557,17 
21 37,50 912,02 30,00 805,50 30,00 720,80 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 2,50 1344,00 
22 33,33 565,65 16,67 1335,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 18,33 523,27 31,67 572,61 
  
 
 
 
 
23 35,83 372,26 33,33 368,00 ,83 1273,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 30,00 534,28 
24 38,33 1069,74 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 29,17 1259,00 32,50 935,10 
25 37,50 883,82 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 5,00 1133,33 27,50 1176,24 30,00 678,47 
26 27,50 782,21 23,33 647,43 14,17 773,94 7,50 897,00 11,67 688,20 15,83 494,16 
27 25,00 657,73 23,33 730,00 18,33 762,80 ,83 246,00 8,33 374,10 24,17 463,45 
28 30,00 880,11 15,00 905,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 10,83 1159,00 44,17 1043,80 
29 38,33 823,00 30,00 1076,00 10,00 1149,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 21,67 527,00 
30 38,33 505,13 4,17 464,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 32,50 484,50 25,00 318,80 
31 35,83 1231,20 26,67 1577,25 5,00 1634,67 ,00 ,00 1,67 1560,00 30,83 1656,60 
32 33,33 731,93 31,67 470,45 4,17 760,80 ,00 ,00 ,83 672,00 30,00 773,56 
33 35,83 915,93 33,33 927,17 ,83 528,00 ,00 ,00 8,33 1046,00 21,67 1030,00 
34 32,50 944,48 35,00 852,62 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 1,67 3921,00 30,83 976,95 
35 26,67 383,88 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 35,00 696,40 38,33 409,63 
36 36,67 348,43 20,83 432,56 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 8,33 504,50 34,17 364,95 
37 27,50 541,09 22,50 692,55 3,33 483,25 ,00 ,00 11,67 647,70 35,00 590,78 
38 41,67 904,42 12,50 1123,80 ,83 2185,00 ,00 ,00 15,00 1503,00 30,00 821,75 
39 32,50 534,07 34,17 484,29 2,50 1844,33 ,00 ,00 ,83 1553,00 30,00 439,53 
40 32,50 567,76 34,17 584,70 ,83 1430,00 ,83 455,00 ,00 ,00 31,67 514,53 
41 35,83 515,72 34,17 650,37 24,17 1010,59 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 5,83 2491,60 
42 28,33 750,58 ,00 ,00 ,83 799,00 ,00 ,00 35,83 978,50 35,00 806,26 
43 34,17 644,17 37,50 1191,33 26,67 731,44 ,00 ,00 ,83 1445,00 ,83 2254,00 
44 34,17 694,68 27,50 619,30 5,83 1161,57 1,67 701,50 5,00 1140,00 25,83 656,55 
45 33,33 661,63 33,33 939,35 32,50 667,56 ,83 576,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
46 34,17 514,95 33,33 687,77 31,67 492,15 ,83 587,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
47 34,17 838,37 20,00 788,38 ,00 ,00 1,67 459,50 7,50 1268,00 36,67 1024,00 
48 28,33 644,94 7,50 781,00 ,83 627,00 ,00 ,00 25,83 963,42 37,50 1222,80 
49 27,50 580,90 35,00 621,33 1,67 990,50 ,83 3389,00 1,67 1294,00 33,33 742,70 
  
 
 
 
 
*Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds) 
Notes: 
FAIR ACCEPT represents a case in which the participant accepted fair offers (case of Ireland 8:8 / 7:9; case of Portugal 6:6 /5:7); 
MID ACCEPT represents a case in which the participant accepted midfair offers (case of Ireland 5:11 / 4:12; case of Portugal 4:8 / 3:9); 
UNFAIR ACCEPT represents a case in which the participant accepted unfair offers (case of Ireland 2:14 / 1:15; case of Portugal 2:10 / 1:11); 
FAIR REJECT represents a case in which the participant rejected fair offers (case of Ireland 8:8 / 7:9; case of Portugal 6:6 /5:7); 
MID REJECT represents a case in which the participant rejected midfair offers (case of Ireland 5:11 / 4:12; case of Portugal 4:8 / 3:9); 
UNFAIR REJECT represents a case in which the participant rejected unfair offers (case of Ireland 2:14 / 1:15; case of Portugal 2:10 / 1:11). 
  
50 28,33 509,44 37,50 689,56 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 34,17 620,10 
51 31,67 755,11 31,67 606,50 36,67 654,71 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
52 30,83 852,22 30,00 1210,78 3,33 5896,75 5,00 1986,80 4,17 2622,00 26,67 644,78 
53 22,50 1117,30 5,00 2787,00 ,00 ,00 11,67 3844,10 23,33 1829,00 37,50 796,33 
54 28,33 348,74 30,83 599,67 1,67 336,00 ,00 ,00 ,83 392,00 38,33 373,78 
55 8,33 857,70 31,67 811,68 11,67 1083,57 30,83 787,70 2,50 3914,00 15,00 696,60 
56 30,83 698,65 35,00 761,20 34,17 635,48 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
57 35,00 425,40 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,83 385,00 30,83 565,70 33,33 544,88 
58 30,00 671,16 31,67 642,84 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 38,33 673,02 
59 15,83 876,47 16,67 916,10 11,67 1041,29 20,83 975,80 10,00 815,10 25,00 925,03 
60 30,00 1085,90 19,17 962,35 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 17,50 1089,00 33,33 1095,30 
  
 
 
 
 
2.1) Behavioural data of the 60 participants (Portuguese participants from 1 to 30 and Irish participants from 31 to 60), during the final phase of the 
Ultimatum Game. This table considers the classification that each participant made on the offers that were proposed during the game as FAIR, MID or UNFAIR 
OFFER, as well as the opponent who made such proposal (in this case, as a FAIR, MID or UNFAIR FACE), on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being very unfair and 5 
being very fair. 
 
PARTICIPANT 
FAIR 
OFFER 
RT (*) MID 
OFFER 
RT (*) UNFAIR 
FAIR 
RT (*) FAIR 
FACE 
RT (*) MID 
FACE 
RT (*) UNFAIR 
FACE 
RT (*) 
1 4,5 766,5 2,5 2259 1.5 414 4 1369,5 2,25 1311 2,75 1157,5 
2 3,5 7186 2,5 2332,5 1 2956,5 4,25 1186,5 3,25 2245 1,5 2875,5 
3 3 2402 1,5 1750 1 4602,5 3,75 2820,5 2,75 2914 1,5 974 
4 5 3668,5 3 1676 3 7173 3,5 3368,3 2,25 2628 1 2384,3 
5 3 3319,5 3 2785 1,5 1860,5 4 4065,3 3,5 2146 2,5 2230,5 
6 5 420 5 1591 1 5589 5 720,75 5 856,8 1 545 
7 4 3035,5 4 2126 1,5 887,5 3,25 2252 3,5 2849 2 904 
8 4 3040 2,5 2023,5 1 762,5 4 3191,8 2,5 3777 1,25 823,5 
9 4 5088,5 2 1611 1,5 805 3,5 1509,3 2 1660 1,25 2133,8 
10 4,5 1097 2 3085,5 1 318,5 4 2716 3,25 510,3 1,25 480,75 
11 4,5 3042 3 1314 1,5 451 4,25 784,25 3,25 2113 1,5 373,5 
12 4,5 2829 3,5 1247 3,5 1965,5 4,75 735 3 2198 1,75 530,5 
13 4,5 2093 3,5 4930,5 1,5 601 4,5 1203 3,5 1700 1,5 242,25 
14 4,5 2648,5 3 1109 1,5 762,5 4 678,25 3,5 772,5 2 429,25 
15 4,5 872 4 4662,5 1 1010 4,75 1787,8 3,5 620,8 1 767,5 
16 5 1881 4,5 1495 3,5 3661,5 3,5 1021,8 3,5 1657 3 405,25 
17 5 3905,5 3 3240,5 1,5 1811,5 4,25 1906,5 3,25 1800 1,75 1530,8 
18 5 2720,5 4 2306 1,5 1092,5 4,75 633,75 3,5 1007 1,75 1021 
19 5 3389 3,5 715 1,5 3242 3,5 1745,5 3,5 1945 1,5 508,75 
20 3,5 3824 3 803 1,5 204 4,5 1377 3 1222 1,75 638 
  
 
 
 
 
21 5 1349 3 2968 1,5 1956,5 4 1438,3 3 625,3 2,5 409,5 
22 4,5 2228 3,5 3231 1,5 1476,5 4 1053 3,5 2086 2 1964,8 
23 5 643,5 3,5 1684,5 2 336 5 935,75 3,5 602,5 1,5 328,75 
24 4,5 1165 1,5 3263,5 1,5 3860,5 4,5 1048,8 1,25 1585 1 846 
25 4,5 3207 3,5 3502 1 487,5 4,5 662,5 2,25 3241 1,5 804 
26 5 975,5 3 2890,5 2 6347 4 1190,3 3,5 2071 2,75 1233,3 
27 3 1389,5 3 3901,5 1 912 4,5 1280,3 3,25 3299 1 532 
28 3,5 4582 3 2031 1,5 2983,5 4,5 1270,8 3,25 1794 2 1830,8 
29 4 4124,5 3,5 2441,5 1 1246 3,75 1002,5 3,25 1052 2,25 3232 
30 4,5 684,5 2,5 2414 2 380 3,25 959 3,25 1217 2,25 1855,3 
31 4 4704 3 7908,5 2 6491,5 4,25 3149,3 2,75 3917 2 1419 
32 4 4594,5 3,5 2330,5 1,5 1053,5 5 795,5 4 2389 1 1317,3 
33 4,5 3909 2,5 2042,5 1 695 4,5 1850 2,75 2565 1 429,25 
34 4,5 3453 3,5 1936 1,5 634 4 2125,8 2,75 1554 1,5 1740,8 
35 2,5 1004 2 4162 1 1744,5 3,75 1450 1,25 1655 1,5 1740,8 
36 5 959,5 3,5 6810 1,5 2336 5 2113 3,5 2792 2 1714,3 
37 4,5 3879,5 2,5 1082 1,5 592 4,5 984,75 2,5 1184 1,25 1113,8 
38 4 1453 3 2808 1 3177,5 4,5 2942,5 3 2776 2 981,75 
39 5 772 3,5 4252 1 637,5 4,5 500,75 3,25 1869 1,25 345 
40 2 4050 3 2911,5 1 1416,5 4,5 748 3,25 738,3 2 1115,8 
41 5 3449,5 3 8866,5 1 1492,5 5 1527,5 3,75 4636 1 1744 
42 4,5 3941 2,5 2696,5 2 4660,5 4,5 1103 3 3368 1,25 912 
43 3 4310,5 2 13707,5 1 924,5 2,25 1032 2 2610 1,5 1199,8 
44 5 2575 2,5 1525,5 1 519 4,25 1105,3 3,5 1541 1,75 444,25 
45 4,5 8737,5 3,5 774,5 1,5 10589,5 4,5 8667,8 3,5 2172 1,5 2446,8 
46 5 599,5 3,5 3341 1,5 1252,5 3,75 736 3,25 378 2,5 2336,3 
47 5 2193 3 2136,5 2,5 5121,5 4,5 1567 3 2461 1,5 2039 
  
 
 
 
 
 
*Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds) 
  
48 4,5 2539,5 2,5 6137 1 2690,5 4 2109,8 2,75 1677 1,5 2177,5 
49 5 3847 3,5 3321 2 6009 4,5 2214,5 4 3037 1,5 1487,5 
50 5 3791 3 6181,5 1 1869 3 2173,8 3,25 1911 3 2113,3 
51 4 4891 2 3619 1 691 3,75 1583,5 3,5 1653 1,25 3163,3 
52 4,5 487,5 3,5 1807,5 1,5 1689 4 1562,3 2,75 1351 3 736,5 
53 3,5 3652 1 1225,5 2,5 6305 3,25 2187,5 2,25 938,8 1,25 428 
54 4,5 2166 3 2369 1 3856 4,5 1603,3 3 1395 1 676,5 
55 3,5 4945,5 2,5 2752 3 5233 2,25 2802,3 3,5 1555 2,75 2287,8 
56 4,5 7437 4 2696 1 1182 4,75 445,75 4,25 1648 2,25 2552,3 
57 3 2869,5 2 1022,5 1 349 2,75 1340,3 2,75 413,3 2,25 556,25 
58 5 1397 3 4546,5 1,5 4526 5 1101,8 3,25 3477 1 1172 
59 4,5 1578,5 3 660,5 2 4429,5 4,75 1267 3 781,5 1,75 896,75 
60 4,5 2994,5 3,5 4284 1 2040,5 4,75 1218,3 3 2856 2 1349,5 
  
 
 
 
 
2.2) Proposer (this task was only behavioural and consisted of 20 trials only). Portuguese (from 1-30) and Irish (from 31-60) participants behavioural results, 
considering that they had to choose how much they would be willing to offer to the opponent they were seeing on the screen. 
PARTICIPANT 
PROPOSAL 
(*) 
RT (**) 
1 1,3 418,6 
2 5,45 1771,65 
3 1 3044,65 
4 2,35 7127,2 
5 3,75 1131,65 
6 1,05 2655,6 
7 1,6 1541,2 
8 3,05 805,65 
9 6 1219,65 
10 1 1275,8 
11 2,25 924,6 
12 3,1 2106,1 
13 4,45 1473,95 
14 2,65 2281,8 
15 2,05 1630,85 
16 1,25 1416,4 
17 1 667,45 
18 1 2041,2 
19 1,1 670,15 
20 4,7 873,2632 
21 2,6 1599,25 
22 3,2 1483,8 
23 3 1735,9 
  
 
 
 
 
24 6 1105,3 
25 1,8 1533,35 
26 5,45 815 
27 4,75 5184,25 
28 3,75 1312,1 
29 3,9 1802,8 
30 6 538 
31 3,5625 1660,8 
32 5,9625 2388,4 
33 4,5 3712,7 
34 2,025 2459,4 
35 2,1 2865,4 
36 1,5 844,8 
37 1,1625 2220,7 
38 4,5 1450,2 
39 1,575 1030,7 
40 2,2875 6267 
41 3,15 1430,35 
42 5,3625 5797 
43 3,7125 2883,2 
44 2,625 1531,2 
45 4,8 1127,7 
46 6 2879,8 
47 3 1099,1 
48 3,1125 1575,2 
49 5,2875 2531,3 
50 2,925 1976 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Proposal were made from 1€ to 6€ for the Portuguese study and from 1€ to 8€ for the Irish one, however for the statistical analysis, all values from the Irish 
participants were converted so that they would be within the same conditions with the ones obtained by the Portuguese participants. 
For example, 
If 6€ is the maximum that Portuguese participants could give, then by multiplying the value obtained from the offer made by the Irish participant and then dividing 
that amount per 8 (maximum in euros that the Irish participants could give), we will be able to get the right conversion: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds)  
51 6 1408,05 
52 6 1969,9 
53 1,3125 2154,7 
54 6 957,35 
55 1,5 527,45 
56 3,9375 1281,8 
57 6 1121,7 
58 6 706,68 
59 6 1604,8 
60 2,8125 1181,4 
  
 
 
 
 
3) Centipede Game (this game had total of 90 trials). Portuguese (from 1-30) and Irish (from 31-60) participants behavioural results (%) and 
Reaction Times (RT) (in milliseconds) 
 
PARTICIPANT 
PASS/COO 
(%) 
RT (*) PASS/MID 
(%) 
RT (*) PASS/FREE 
(%) 
RT (*) TAKE/COO 
(%) 
RT (*) TAKE/MID 
(%) 
RT (*) TAKE/FREE 
(%) 
RT (*) 
1 28,89 466,62 31,11 414,71 15,56 542,10 4,44 534,50 2,22 524,00 17,78 481,50 
2 20,00 1352,78 28,89 1385,70 11,11 1924,00 13,33 747,17 4,44 1036,5 22,22 1577,10 
3 11,11 7062,60 22,22 2178,40 17,78 1407,00 22,22 1643,80 11,11 1876,0 15,56 1250,43 
4 20,00 1269,78 26,67 1547,90 13,33 1730,00 13,33 2053,83 6,67 1353,3 20,00 1552,78 
5 26,67 1188,75 28,89 996,46 22,22 881,70 6,67 1507,00 4,44 1406,0 11,11 1081,80 
6 13,33 1260,83 22,22 1298,00 20,00 926,60 20,00 1202,00 11,11 1315,6 13,33 881,17 
7 22,22 468,90 24,44 651,73 13,33 515,30 11,11 585,60 8,89 476,00 20,00 416,11 
8 20,00 1049,67 28,89 631,31 33,33 491,20 13,33 576,17 4,44 422,00 ,00 ,00 
9 31,11 939,21 33,33 718,20 26,67 989,80 2,22 1010,00 ,00 ,00 6,67 2219,33 
10 24,44 1283,09 28,89 1231,60 28,89 1499,00 8,89 760,50 4,44 1169,5 4,44 991,00 
11 24,44 927,18 22,22 881,10 11,11 1585,00 8,89 978,00 11,11 1153,0 22,22 1092,50 
12 26,67 875,50 28,89 892,85 17,78 977,00 6,67 716,67 4,44 514,50 15,56 596,71 
13 26,67 717,42 33,33 803,67 15,56 1257,00 6,67 803,67 ,00 ,00 17,78 673,75 
14 15,56 626,29 20,00 958,00 15,56 864,60 17,78 961,50 13,33 828,00 17,78 787,63 
15 22,22 1108,60 28,89 621,85 15,56 1094,00 11,11 646,80 4,44 669,00 17,78 1329,00 
16 26,67 1638,25 31,11 2658,00 31,11 1299,00 6,67 922,00 2,22 583,00 2,22 1632,00 
17 28,89 530,08 28,89 822,08 15,56 241,00 4,44 478,50 4,44 363,00 17,78 301,75 
18 17,78 1108,25 24,44 1118,70 6,67 1310,00 15,56 1536,00 8,89 1089,8 26,67 1203,08 
19 24,44 1258,09 24,44 1206,80 11,11 1432,00 8,89 558,25 8,89 541,50 22,22 750,00 
20 22,22 775,40 20,00 778,33 11,11 1669,00 11,11 551,80 13,33 533,83 22,22 478,40 
21 17,78 1387,75 31,11 2516,60 13,33 951,00 15,56 939,86 2,22 565,00 20,00 2355,56 
22 24,44 803,64 26,67 844,83 8,89 742,80 8,89 1423,50 6,67 915,67 24,44 458,27 
  
 
 
 
 
23 22,22 450,70 26,67 582,00 13,33 435,30 11,11 515,80 6,67 813,67 20,00 454,67 
24 17,78 1274,25 26,67 1203,80 11,11 1595,00 15,56 983,00 6,67 818,33 22,22 586,30 
25 22,22 631,50 20,00 735,22 8,89 1164,00 11,11 672,80 13,33 405,33 24,44 471,73 
26 22,22 1006,30 20,00 1202,60 13,33 538,50 11,11 1397,60 13,33 1021,20 20,00 585,56 
27 22,22 731,20 26,67 588,33 15,56 806,70 11,11 1124,80 6,67 551,33 17,78 484,25 
28 26,67 1589,50 31,11 1194,40 22,22 1775,00 6,67 1594,00 2,22 928,00 11,11 1761,20 
29 26,67 600,17 28,89 758,38 17,78 573,90 6,67 876,00 4,44 347,50 15,56 424,00 
30 11,11 489,20 11,11 544,40 ,00 ,00 22,22 441,40 22,22 404,10 33,33 531,40 
31 22,22 2121,90 28,89 22007,0 8,89 9108,00 11,11 6391,00 4,44 1996,0 24,44 11614,0 
32 28,89 16993,0 33,33 20358,0 31,11 13071,00 4,44 2781,00 ,00 ,00 2,22 530,00 
33 26,67 824,50 31,11 943,93 20,00 648,10 6,67 757,66 2,22 619,00 13,33 845,17 
34 22,22 853,00 24,44 1352,90 31,11 1030,00 11,11 642,20 8,89 2130,00 2,22 1142,00 
35 8,89 721,00 ,00 ,00 2,22 3202,00 24,44 523,82 33,33 796,40 31,11 542,93 
36 22,22 542,20 28,89 572,38 8,89 511,00 11,11 732,00 4,44 471,50 24,44 533,82 
37 20,00 700,33 24,44 1038,60 17,78 555,90 13,33 689,33 8,89 497,25 15,56 589,28 
38 22,22 1398,40 28,89 1798,10 28,89 1231,00 11,11 1413,20 4,44 1898,5 4,44 797,50 
39 20,00 2082,44 26,67 466,66 15,56 761,60 13,33 752,33 6,67 742,33 17,78 552,25 
40 24,44 625,27 24,44 701,63 22,22 578,60 8,89 863,50 8,89 835,00 11,11 854,20 
41 20,00 5882,78 26,67 1756,80 17,78 8810,00 13,33 2785,67 6,67 4925,30 15,56 3916,29 
42 11,11 648,80 22,22 538,60 17,78 688,30 22,22 1393,50 11,11 686,80 15,56 745,57 
43 28,89 871,46 26,67 888,16 17,78 652,40 4,44 573,00 6,67 729,33 15,56 739,86 
44 28,89 742,23 31,11 806,71 20,00 745,70 4,44 550,50 2,22 381,00 13,33 595,17 
45 26,67 1262,00 26,67 759,58 11,11 666,20 6,67 950,00 6,67 712,00 22,22 922,20 
46 24,44 623,00 28,89 634,69 11,11 524,00 8,89 467,25 4,44 574,50 22,22 339,80 
47 26,67 937,25 22,22 1143,60 13,33 1286,00 6,67 687,30 11,11 690,00 20,00 623,67 
48 42,22 1112,11 31,11 875,43 17,78 1428,00 13,33 1039,30 2,22 553,00 15,56 695,14 
49 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 33,33 763,30 33,33 904,00 33,33 1232,40 
  
 
 
 
 
*Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds) 
Notes:  
PASS/COO represents a situation in which the participant is passing the pot, as well as their opponent; 
PASS/MID represents a situation in which the participant is passing the pot, while the opponent is passing the pot for half of the round and the other half s/he 
is taking the money; 
PASS/FREE represents a situation in which the participant is passing the pot, while the opponent is taking the money; 
TAKE/COO represents a situation in which the participant is taking the pot, while the opponent is passing the money; 
TAKE/MID represents a situation in which the participant is taking the pot, while the opponent is passing the pot for half of the round and the other half s/he is 
taking the money; 
TAKE/FREE represents a situation in which the participant is taking the pot, as well as their opponent; 
  
50 26,67 1062,08 22,22 602,10 8,89 825,30 6,67 542,30 11,11 748,80 24,44 650,55 
51 31,11 614,21 33,33 699,21 22,22 840,90 2,22 579,00 ,00 ,00 11,11 494,00 
52 22,22 918,10 28,89 1645,00 22,22 3560,00 11,11 1010,40 4,44 1214,00 11,11 540,00 
53 15,56 1536,70 15,56 711,57 8,89 604,50 17,78 1229,38 17,78 1240,40 24,44 1215,36 
54 26,67 692,50 24,44 763,64 6,67 1015,00 6,67 668,30 8,89 689,00 26,67 698,58 
55 24,44 568,09 24,44 790,64 15,56 784,10 8,89 701,50 8,89 591,25 17,78 630,50 
56 26,67 702,50 24,44 650,00 6,67 533,70 6,67 650,30 8,89 396,25 26,67 634,67 
57 22,22 539,10 26,67 407,00 15,56 407,10 11,11 383,40 6,67 393,30 17,78 521,37 
58 13,33 1552,23 20,00 1120,70 11,11 648,60 20,00 623,00 13,33 745,67 22,22 1388,80 
59 17,78 904,00 28,89 663,23 13,33 855,20 15,56 624,86 4,44 626,50 20,00 640,67 
60 26,67 1066,83 33,33 725,93 20,00 1029,33 6,67 844,66 ,00 ,00 13,33 643,50 
  
 
 
 
 
4) Public Game (this game had total of 90 trials). Portuguese (from 1-30) and Irish (from 31-60) participants behavioural results (%) and 
Reaction Times (RT) (in milliseconds) 
 
PARTICIPANT SUCCESS 
(COOPERATION) 
(%) 
RT (*) MIDFAIR 
(COOPERATION) 
(%) 
RT (*) FAILURE 
(COOPERATION) 
(%) 
RT (*) 
1 1,111111 581 1,111111 426 0 0 
2 50 1376,47 16,66667 3060,6 3,333333 1182 
3 38,88889 1059,94 11,11111 917,4 24,44444 986,45 
4 50 1253,31 13,33333 1822,25 26,66667 1533,25 
5 7,777778 706 5,555556 712,6 5,555556 777 
6 25,55556 1294,04 7,777778 1423,14 8,888889 1101,25 
7 47,77778 789,18 8,888889 1188,25 3,333333 1086,3 
8 37,77778 577,29 8,888889 743,5 4,444444 600,5 
9 24,44444 1018,59 15,55556 915,14 3,333333 1401,67 
10 30 869,33 3,333333 1076,33 1,111111 550 
11 32,22222 904,31 5,555556 1180,2 2,222222 1396,5 
12 31,11111 1004,25 12,22222 844,45 10 627 
13 20 1205,33 11,11111 1752,4 5,555556 883,8 
14 14,44444 859,23 8,888889 743,87 5,555556 560 
15 17,77778 1024,13 6,666667 1292 2,222222 593 
16 31,11111 1245,61 14,44444 589,77 25,55556 630,56 
17 22,22222 620,5 5,555556 688,8 2,222222 195,5 
18 33,33333 1113,67 11,11111 2434,3 3,333333 1577,67 
19 8,888889 667,37 14,44444 668,15 2,222222 947 
20 4,444444 1290,75 0 0 1,111111 527 
21 21,11111 663,42 13,33333 584,67 11,11111 578,2 
22 10 1568,11 4,444444 1936,5 12,22222 750,27 
  
 
 
 
 
23 47,77778 577,02 4,444444 893 3,333333 1432 
24 1,111111 716 0 0 0 0 
25 3,333333 1100,4 3,333333 467,67 1,111111 406 
26 34,44444 651,87 10 895,67 17,77778 554,69 
27 12,22222 1439,91 4,444444 1076 2,222222 771 
28 30 896,93 13,33333 801,83 8,888889 1224 
29 31,11111 942,36 5,555556 711,2 6,666667 663 
30 38,88889 724,54 7,777778 492,29 0 815,33 
31 45,55556 1649,46 6,666667 1976,67 6,666667 2405 
32 38,88889 870,71 12,22222 1479,82  10 2897,8 
33 38,88889 1970,37 14,44444 1139,77 4,444444 2036 
34 27,77778 1574,24 10 852 18,88889 1439,82 
35 15,55556 877,14 4,444444 1127 0 0 
36 50 579,51 15,55556 650,43 3,333333 856 
37 5,555556 1513,8 5,555556 1398,6 1,111111 592 
38 31,11111 1621,89 10 1082,33 15,55556  1289,57 
39 25,55556 860,61 2,222222 574,5 1,111111 960 
40 17,77778 920,88 6,666667 829,17 10 554,22 
41 24,44444 1332,45 10 2533,22 4,444444 871,5 
42 6,666667 2411,17 5,555556 843,2 4,444444 864 
43 40 969,56 8,888889 1090,25 4,444444 1215 
44 50 684,29 16,66667 679,33 11,11111 804 
45 27,77778 1433,64 14,44444 1302,23 3,333333 1469,33 
46 27,77778 743,24 8,888889 440 16,66667 741,93 
47 21,11111 1790,84 6,666667 1732 4,444444 1505 
48 20 1200,61 12,22222 810,72 2,222222 931,25 
49 12,22222 1265,73 8,888889 553,88 2,222222 1505,75 
  
 
 
 
 
50 33,33333 891,73 12,22222 837,64 4,444444 1361,5 
51 18,88889 1151,24 10 877,88 10 702,77 
52 25,55556 2150,13 6,666667 1086,83 24,44444 2049,9 
53 23,33333 1831,19 5,555556 1102,2 3,333333 1379,67 
54 37,77778 664 11,11111 408,1 2,222222 766 
55 21,11111 1101,89 1,111111 733 2,222222 562 
56 50 874,13 14,44444 1359,54 4,444444 830,25 
57 47,77778 675,02 15,55556 584,93 18,88889 471,82 
58 50 806,6 16,66667 1487,06 33,33333 1222,13 
59 12,22222 1127,91 1,111111 1048 4,444444 1088,75 
60 15,55556 1373,93 7,777778 739 4,444444 1455 
 
 
PARTICIPANT SUCCESS 
(FREERIDE) 
(%) 
RT (*) MIDFAIR 
(FREERIDE) 
(%) 
RT (*) FAILURE 
(FREERIDE) 
(%) 
RT (*) 
1 48,88889 417,11 15,55556 342,71 33,33333 550,17 
2 0 0 0 0 30 1541,6 
3 11,11111 2904,22 5,555556 1127,4 8,888889 1920,625 
4 0 0 3,333333 2747 6,666667 1228,67 
5 42,22222 804,76 11,11111 701,3 27,77778 461,5 
6 24,44444 1294,63 8,888889 1177,125 24,44444 1004,5 
7 2,222222 2586,50 7,777778 1552,60 30 750,37 
8 12,22222 594,63 7,777778 747,29 28,88889 477,35 
9 25,55556 753,35 1,111111 525 30 771,56 
10 20 969,61 13,33333 941,67 32,22222 949,9 
11 17,77778 981,75 11,11111 971,70 31,11111 893,96 
  
 
 
 
 
12 18,88889 852 4,444444 860,50 23,33333 714,09 
13 30 866,56 5,555556 1187,8 27,77778 698,52 
14 35,55556 996,91 7,777778 979,86 27,77778 728,08 
15 32,22222 994,68 10 989,44 31,11111 549 
16 18,88889 932,35 2,222222 587,5 7,777778 801,57 
17 27,77778 507,76 11,11111 430,10 31,11111 489,71 
18 16,66667 975,93 5,555556 992,8 30 1244,63 
19 41,11111 713,65 2,222222 992,8 31,11111 756,57 
20 45,55556 663,68 16,66667 861,07 32,22222 483,65 
21 28,88889 576,62 3,333333 685 22,22222 437,45 
22 40 791,44 12,22222 757,27 21,11111 894 
23 2,222222 1069,5 12,22222 1182,82 30 611,04 
24 48,88889 894,86 16,66667 648,07 33,33333 585,57 
25 46,66667 811,53 13,33333 707,92 32,22222 712,03 
26 15,55556 759,85 6,666667 760,5 15,55556 618,5 
27 37,77778 1469,26 12,22222 1737,27 31,11111 1468,78 
28 20 705,78 3,333333 1056 24,44444 1003,45 
29 18,88889 1129,41 11,11111 860,5 26,66667 754,54 
30 11,11111 506,5 8,888889 1010,5 0 474,56 
31 4,444444 1553 10 2376,44 26,66667 2105,8 
32 11,11111 2041 4,444444 1176 23,33333 1081,38 
33 11,11111 813 2,222222 7314,5 28,88889 955,423 
34 22,22222 1294,8 6,666667 916,83 14,44444 847,46 
35 34,44444 552,65 12,22222 779,64 33,33333 459,367 
36 0 0 1,111111 835 30 642,74 
37 44,44444 717,92 11,11111 601,2 32,22222 873,9 
38 18,88889 1411,47 6,666667 1707,5  1176,56 
39 24,44444 691,63 14,44444 491,5 32,22222 511,24 
  
 
 
 
 
40 31,11111 699,58 10 2949,33 23,33333 823,81 
41 25,55556 1571,87 6,666667 1574,33 28,88889 749,07 
42 43,33333 778,79 11,11111 799,5 28,88889 643,423 
43 10 549,33 7,777778 885 28,88889 726,57 
44 0 0 0 0 22,22222 682,55 
45 22,22222 1578,75 2,222222 2366 30 858,56 
46 22,22222 556,7 7,777778 532,14 16,66667 454 
47 28,88889 1029 10 1634 28,88889 879,11 
48 30 944,88 4,444444 625,25 31,11111 1041,73 
49 37,77778 1067,62 7,777778 638,57 31,11111 1422 
50 16,66667 669,13 4,444444 575,5 28,88889 595,23 
51 31,11111 722,25 6,666667 879,83 23,33333 895,76 
52 24,44444 911 10 1942 8,888889 1847,8 
53 26,66667 1179,54 11,11111 1168,7 30 1294,4 
54 12,22222 1232,18 5,555556 1284,2 31,11111 566,8 
55 28,88889 719,85 15,55556 722,5 31,11111 643,7 
56 0 0 2,222222 205,3 28,88889 688,346 
57 2,222222 356 1,111111 361 14,44444 482,69 
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 
59 37,77778 610,94 15,55556 571,14 28,88889 717,42 
60 34,44444 1132,74 8,888889 1357,88 28,88889 900,07    
 
*Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds) 
Notes: 
SUCCESS (COOPERATION) represent a situation in which the participant is giving €5 to the public pot and the group is also contributing to it; 
SUCCESS (FREERIDE) represent a situation in which the participant is not contributing to the group, while the opponents do so; 
  
 
 
 
 
MIDFAIR (COOPERATION) represent a situation in which the participant is giving €5 or not to the public pot, while the group is contributing to it; 
MIDFAIR (FREERIDE) represent a situation in which the participant is not contributing to the public pot and at least one member is not giving money to the 
group; 
FAILURE (COOPERATION) represent a situation in which the participant is giving €5 to the public pot and at least two members are not giving money to the 
group; 
 
FAILURE (FREERIDE) represent a situation in which the participant is not contributing to the public pot and at least two members are not giving money to the 
group.  
  
 
 
 
 
5) Volunteer’s Dilemma (this game had total of 65 trials). Portuguese (from 1-30) and Irish (from 31-60) participants behavioural results (%) 
and Reaction Times (RT) (in milliseconds) 
 
PARTICIPANT 
 PASS/EVERYONE 
KEEPS 
(%) 
RT (*) TAKE/EVERYONEKEEPS 
(%) 
RT (*) TAKE/EVERYONELOSES 
(%) 
RT (*) 
1  13,85 441,67 47,69 649,26 38,46 394,44 
2  100,00 1680,03 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
3  96,92 1020,37 1,54 946,00 1,54 497,00 
4  33,85 1820,32 36,92 2021,63 29,23 1640,79 
5  76,92 855,70 10,77 1102,29 12,31 1054,13 
6  64,62 1005,86 18,46 1010,83 16,92 881,09 
7  15,38 534,40 47,69 610,48 36,92 454,38 
8  36,92 443,25 36,92 508,79 26,15 507,41 
9  78,46 1065,09 13,85 1306,22 7,69 1450,40 
10  27,69 902,83 36,92 1775,63 35,38 1444,96 
11  49,23 672,94 23,08 860,80 27,69 664,44 
12  55,38 746,61 18,46 1258,83 26,15 733,12 
13  55,38 881,38 23,08 718,00 21,54 524,21 
14  61,54 957,25 23,08 927,73 15,38 947,40 
15  47,69 792,26 26,15 647,88 26,15 472,42 
16  55,38 976,47 27,69 2723,30 16,92 960,27 
17  69,23 451,09 16,92 704,82 13,85 598,44 
18  30,77 1379,55 43,08 1206,64 26,15 1404,18 
19  58,46 856,65 27,69 934,88 13,85 730,67 
20  15,38 1116,60 46,15 1081,73 38,46 679,72 
21  98,46 985,84 1,54 343,00 ,00 ,00 
  
 
 
 
 
22  40,00 631,15 29,23 928,68 30,77 604,30 
23  41,54 683,59 32,31 561,19 26,15 581,88 
24  32,31 1260,43 33,85 1090,41 33,85 1446,46 
25  18,46 879,92 50,77 785,27 30,77 856,55 
26  33,85 1069,82 35,38 541,56 30,77 523,10 
27  9,23 1027,17 49,23 792,00 41,54 914,59 
28  69,23 1091,56 13,85 1005,33 16,92 1136,45 
29  32,31 843,62 35,38 559,39 32,31 739,86 
30  52,31 1289,38 26,15 636,76 21,54 401,78 
31  60,00 1727,15 20,00 1213,85 20,00 1466,07 
32  36,92 1943,04 32,31 1728,40 30,77 1879,80 
33  93,85 699,97 3,08 662,00 3,08 1900,50 
34  63,08 921,07 23,08 1335,73 13,85 1165,00 
35  6,15 1125,75 52,31 734,12 41,54 565,37 
36  69,23 764,40 18,46 854,92 12,31 560,63 
37  73,85 672,02 13,85 803,56 12,31 1249,75 
38  47,69 2064,52 26,15 2648,23 26,15 1859,60 
39  60,00 985,85 20,00 802,40 20,00 616,31 
40  47,69 673,06 27,69 603,44 24,62 584,68 
41  23,08 2133,90 41,54 2216,30 35,38 1868,50 
42  40,00 907,00 29,23 1047,42 30,77 654,75 
43  86,15 724,77 7,69 1343,20 6,15 683,25 
44  61,54 617,02 20,00 407,77 18,46 1398,20 
45  100,00 1304,94 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
46  32,31 495,90 40,00 638,08 27,69 332,89 
47  32,31 1035,50 36,92 1084,60 30,77 1257,40 
48  58,46 1065,71 24,62 1173,43 16,92 921,54 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Reaction Time to the stimulus (in milliseconds) 
Notes: 
PASS/EVERYONE KEEPS represents a situation in which the participant decided to contribute to the group; 
TAKE/EVERYONEKEEPS represents a situation in which the participant decided to keep their money, while at least one opponent decided to contribute towards 
the group; 
TAKE/EVERYONELOSES represents a situation in which the participant decided to keep their money, as well as all the members of the group. 
 
49  72,31 597,64 10,77 2337,43 16,92 484,73 
50  60,00 766,84 23,08 1567,46 16,92 832,82 
51  80,00 747,04 7,69 711,00 13,85 858,63 
52  87,69 827,84 6,15 485,50 6,15 866,75 
53  98,46 1003,13 1,54 2574,00 ,00 ,00 
54  16,92 332,55 44,62 685,86 38,46 616,32 
55  13,85 932,44 47,69 1125,48 38,46 1022,72 
56  29,23 1880,00 35,38 1441,56 35,38 1063,44 
57  43,08 758,12 33,85 1092,30 23,08 833,73 
58  66,15 1059,65 21,54 881,71 12,31 997,12 
59  26,15 2361,76 40,00 1606,42 33,85 1549,59 
60  36,92 1162,08 30,77 1252,95 32,31 1065,81 
  
 
 
 
 
XVIII- Channels eliminated and/or interpolated, and participants 
eliminated from the neurophysiological analysis 
 
Rock-Paper Scissors Game 
 
Participant Number 
 
Electrode(s) eliminated 
and/or interpolated 
Participant eliminated 
 
 
16 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 16 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
17 FC5, CP1 eliminated  
19 CP2 eliminated  
23 FC5 eliminated  
26 Cz, C3 interpolated  
32 O2 was broken, which 
affected the ribbon, and 
consequently the EEG 
signal 
Participant 32 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
36 CP6 interpolated  
40 F7 interpolated  
42 F3 interpolated  
44 FP1 eliminated  
50 F8 eliminated  
52 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 52 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
53 FC2, O2, F7 eliminated  
55 O2 eliminated 
T8, FC6 eliminated 
 
58 F7 eliminated  
 
PARTICIPANTS 16, 32 AND 52 WERE REMOVED FROM THE EEG ANALYSIS 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ultimatum Game 
 
Participant Number 
 
Electrode(s) eliminated 
and/or interpolated 
Participant eliminated 
 
 
2 FC2, F4, CP2 eliminated  
3 FP1, F3, FC1, FC5 
eliminated 
 
4 O1, F3, FC1, FP1 
eliminated 
 
5 FP1 eliminated  
6 FP1, CP2 eliminated  
8 FP1, FC1 eliminated  
10 FP1, FC2 eliminated  
11 FP1, F4, FC1 eliminated 
Cz, CP1, CP2, CP5 
interpolated 
 
12 F4 eliminated  
13 CP6, O1 eliminated  
16 F7, CP1, T7 eliminated  
17 P4 eliminated  
18 FP1 eliminated  
20 FP1, CP2 eliminated  
22 F7, CP2 eliminated  
23 F4, FC2, FC5 eliminated  
24 FP1, F4, FC2, CP2 
eliminated 
 
25 FP1, CP2 eliminated  
26 C3, Cz interpolated  
27 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 27 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
  
 
 
 
 
28 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 28 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
29 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 29 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
30 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 30 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
31 T8, F7, F4, F8 eliminated  
32 O2 was broken, which 
affected the ribbon, and 
consequently the EEG 
signal 
Participant 32 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
33 CP6 eliminated  
34 O2, P4, P8 eliminated  
36 CP6, F7 eliminated  
37 F4, P8 eliminated  
38 F4, FP1, FP2, P4 
eliminated 
 
39 F8 eliminated  
40 O2, F7 eliminated  
42 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 42 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
43 O2 eliminated  
44 O2 eliminated  
45 F4, P8 eliminated  
46 P4, F8 eliminated  
47 FC6 eliminated  
48 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 48 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
49 C4, F7, O2 eliminated  
  
 
 
 
 
50 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 50 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
51 P8, O2, P4 eliminated  
52 P4, O2 eliminated  
53 O2 eliminated  
54 F4 eliminated  
55 O2, C4, T8 eliminated  
56 O2, F7, P8 eliminated  
57 CP5, P4 eliminated  
58 EEG signal was very noisy, 
even after removing major 
artifacts 
Participant 58 was only 
eliminated from the EEG 
analysis perspective 
60 F7 eliminated  
 
PARTICIPANTS 27,28, 29, 30, 32, 42, 48, 50 AND 58 WERE REMOVED FROM 
THE EEG ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
XIX- Poster Presentation at FENS Forum, July 2018 in Belin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
